Land Use Moratoria and Temporary Takings Redefined After Lake Tahoe? by McKaskle, Laura Hurmence
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 2 Article 3
1-20-2003
Land Use Moratoria and Temporary Takings
Redefined After Lake Tahoe?
Laura Hurmence McKaskle
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Land Use
Planning Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laura Hurmence McKaskle Land Use Moratoria and Temporary Takings Redefined After Lake Tahoe?, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (2003)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/3
Land Use Moratoria and
Temporary Takings
Redefined After Lake
Tahoe?
I. INTRODUCTION
II. BACKGROUND
A. Moratoria Terminology
B. Purpose for Implementing Moratoria Ordinances
C. Litigious Versus Non-Litigious Moratoria Ordinances
D. State's Power to Enact Moratoria Ordinances
III. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Procedural Requirements for Plaintiffs
B. Standard of Review
C. Procedural Requirements for Drafting Moratoria Ordinances
D. The Vested Right Doctrine - A Landowner's Defense
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. Due Process Challenge
B. Equal Protection Challenge
C. First Amendment Challenge
D. Takings Challenge
V. CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE
VI. SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE
VII. TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, INC. V. TAHOE REGIONAL
PLANNING AGENCY
A. District Court Opinion
B. Ninth Circuit Opinion
C. Supreme Court's Opinion-Majority Opinion
D. Supreme Court Opinion-Dissenting Opinion
VIII. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
From the time the Supreme Court gave birth to the doctrine of
"regulatory takings" in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' courts have
struggled in defining when a regulation amounts to a taking.' The Supreme
Court's expanded use of regulatory takings has been making a highly
controversial and confusing concept more difficult to apply and defend.3
Recently, the Court reentered the regulatory taking ground, and it had an
opportunity to clear up the "murky waters" of regulatory taking
jurisprudence when it granted certiorari to the landowners in the Lake Tahoe
controversy.4
Land use moratoria ordinances were at the center of the Lake Tahoe
regulatory taking controversyf Moratorium ordinances have been used as
an effective land use planning tool for decades. 6  While the moratorium
doctrine serves as an effective planning tool for land use city planners, its
constitutionality has been questioned since its inception.7 These ordinances
have involved a constant struggle between individual landowners and the
rights of the public at large from the time the concept was first created and
implemented.8 The struggle exists because every year, the country's
population continues to increase; land is not as plentiful as it once was, and
natural resources continue to be depleted. 9 This downward spiral has caused
a continuous tension between individual landowners who want to use their
land as they see fit and others who want to preserve the land and its
resources and prevent its development.' ° The struggle has, in the past,
favored property owners."1
[T]he Rehnquist Court has demonstrated an increasing willingness
to determine the fairness and legitimacy of regulation and statutes
that negatively affect the value and use of real and personal property
1. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that a government regulation amounts to a violation of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause when the regulation goes "too far").
2. Anthony Saul Alperin, The "Takings" Clause: When Does Regulation "Go Too Far"?, 31
Sw. U. L. REV. 169, 170 (2002).
3. Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive
Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2158 (2002).
4. Gideon Kanner, Temporary Takings, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A21.
5. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
6. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 777
(2000), reh 'g denied, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
7. Thomas E. Roberts, Moratoria as Categorical Regulatory Takings: What First English and
Lucas Say and Don't Say, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11037, 11037 (2001).
8. Laura M. Rojas, Interim Ordinances in California: Restoring Balance Between the Rights of
Individual Landowners and the Rights of the Public, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 715, 715 (1998).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Changing Course: U.S. Supreme Court Rules in Takings Case, 227 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2002).
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or that interfere with private property rights. The Court has
reconceptualized the Takings Clause, deploying it as a powerful
new tool to neutralize a wide range of environmental and land-use
regulation and to uphold personal liberty-the right to own and use
private property-that some Justices feel has been severely
devalued.' 2
This trend took a sharp and sudden tum when the Supreme Court, in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, rejected property owners' contentions that a three-year moratorium
on development constituted a per se taking of property requiring
compensation under the Takings Clause.' 3 The Tahoe-Sierra ruling pulls the
Court away from the recent trend of embracing a more categorical approach
to property rights that has been championed by Justice Scalia.14 The Court's
initiative in determining the constitutionality of temporary land use
moratorium ordinances in Tahoe-Sierra was thought to reveal the Court's
willingness to finally resolve this ongoing dispute about what constitutes a
regulatory taking.'
5
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion did not offer much insight as to how
to apply the confusing concept, nor did it definitively answer what
constitutes a temporary regulatory taking.' 6 The Court merely held that in
answering the "abstract question" as to "whether a temporary moratorium
effects a taking," the answer is "neither 'yes, always' nor 'no, never';
[rather,] the answer depends upon the particular circumstances of the
case."' 7 The Court did, however, conclude that a thirty-two month ban on
development-actually turning into a twenty year halt on all development-
was not a regulatory taking.' 8 According to the Court, it was simply an
interruption in property ownership.' 9 The Court's decision was a victory for
both the regional planning agency in Lake Tahoe and local planning officials
12. Haar & Wolf, supra note 3, at 2169.
13. Id.
14. Supreme Court's Reversal of Trend on Property Right Case Noted, BULLETIN'S
FRONTRUNNER, Apr. 26, 2002 [hereinafter Supreme Court's Reversal].
15. Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037; see also Robert H. Freilich, Regulatory Takings After
Palazzolo: Intermin [sic] Development Controls, Moratoria, and Economic Diminution Cases,
SG021 ALI-ABA 163, 181 (2001).
16. Alperin, supra note 2, at 170.
17. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1478
(2002).
18. Id. at 1489.
19. See id.
275
generally. z Regrettably, it was a loss for hundreds of people who bought
land around the lake on the California-Nevada border and have waited
decades to develop their property.2'
Land use commentators are certainly not all in agreement with the
outcome in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency,22 but most agree that the decision will have a distinct and
profound effect on the future of all land use moratorium ordinances. 23 It
"'dealt a major setback to the conservative-led property rights movement,
ending its string of recent Supreme Court victories elevating the rights of
individual property owners over valid planning and community needs.'
24
This Comment provides an extensive analysis of land use moratorium,
including a historic analysis of its origin, constitutional challenges against its
validity, and the Supreme Court's conclusions as to its constitutionality.
Part II of the Comment identifies the reasons city planning boards and local
government municipalities impose land use moratorium ordinances;
discusses the varying types of moratoria ordinances that are litigated and
challenged by landowners and developers, and the types that are frequently
used in the course of land use planning that raise no litigious concerns; and
addresses where the power to enact moratoria ordinances originates. Part III
analyzes the procedural requirements a party challenging the moratorium
ordinance must meet to bring a claim against the ordinance, the standard of
review courts use to examine moratorium ordinances, and the procedural
requirements a city must meet in drafting the moratorium ordinance. Part IV
categorizes traditional constitutional challenges that may be available to an
aggrieved landowner or developer. Part V addresses the controversial
concept in regulatory takings known as "conceptual severance," which was
the center of the Tahoe-Sierra decision. Part VI classifies significant
Supreme Court decisions prior to Tahoe-Sierra that address land use
development issues and identify possible concerns that arise when a city
places a moratorium on development. Part VII focuses on the backdrop to
the Tahoe-Sierra controversy, categorizing the relevant district court and
appellate court holdings that prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari
and addressing the Supreme Court's conclusions to the constitutionality and
validity of temporary moratoria, temporary takings, and conceptual
severance articulated in Tahoe-Sierra. Finally, Part VIII concludes the
Comment with an analysis of the implications and ramifications the Tahoe-
20. Anne Gearan, High Court Backs Local Government in Property Rights Clash,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at A5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037.
24. Supreme Courts Reversal, supra note 14 (quoting The Court Reverses Direction, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 26, 2002, at A28).
276
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Sierra holding will have on future cases dealing with all types of land use
moratorium.
II. BACKGROUND
The concept of land use moratorium has been used by land use planners
for decades; however, the term "moratorium" is a fairly recent term in land
use planning. The term was not used in early cases; it has only surfaced in
the last ten or fifteen years.26 More familiar terms related to a moratorium
on land use development are the terms "stopgap zoning" and, particularly,
"interim zoning.' '27 A practitioner is advised to conduct research for terms
such as "interim zoning," "stopgap zoning," or "moratoria" when
investigating the topic. 28
A. Moratoria Terminology
The legal principles related to the two terms "stopgap zoning" and
"interim zoning" appear interchangeable. 29  However, interim zoning is
conceptually different from stopgap zoning.30 While the two terms have
been used to describe the essential process of moratoriums, a Washington
court stated that the terms "stopgap zoning" and "interim zoning" are not
interchangeable.3' "Interim zoning is no mere stopgap, but rather is a
deliberate and purposeful device designed to classify or regulate uses of land
and related matters, and is necessary to preserve the zoning scheme as
presented to the public in the comprehensive plan and attendant maps and
25. Paul R. Gougleman, Fla. Bar, Moratoria and Interim Growth Management, in 2 FLORIDA
ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE LAW HANDBOOK 5-1,4 (1994), WL ELUII FL-CLE 5-1.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id
29. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 624 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (stating that
a moratorium on the installation of cellular tower antennas was not a valid stopgap or interim zoning
ordinance because it was not a valid exercise of the town's police power); Noghrey v. Acampora,
543 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding stopgap zoning and interim zoning ordinances are
valid if they are reasonably designed to temporarily halt development while municipalities consider
comprehensive zoning changes); W. Lane Properties v. Lombardi, 527 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988) (upholding a 90 day moratorium ordinance as a valid stopgap zoning or interim zoning
ordinance because it was a reasonable measure to halt development while the town considered its
comprehensive zoning changes).
30. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 4.
31. Smith v. Skagit County, 453 P.2d 832 (Wash. 1969) (holding that hearings before county
planning commission and county board with respect to proposed zoning change did not meet test of
fairness).
resolutions or ordinances."" Interim zoning describes a process whereby a
governmental body, in response to an emergency situation, temporarily
establishes an ordinance to classify or regulate uses of land pending either
revision of the existing zoning code or adoption of a final, comprehensive
zoning plan. 33 "Interim ordinances were initially used as a way to prevent
growth while zoning ordinances were being studied, to prevent growth in
overburdened cities, and to stop development in environmentally sensitive
areas." 34  Unfortunately, they have been used to freeze development
altogether and essentially restrain a wide range of activities such as video
arcades, mobile homes, fast food restaurants, and adult entertainment
businesses.
35
Stopgap zoning, on the other hand, seems to be what most people refer
to as a zoning moratorium. 36 The distinction between the term "stopgap
zoning" and the term "moratorium" is unclear; nevertheless, the term
"moratorium" was developed because it better describes the process of
halting development for a particular period of time.37 The terms "stopgap
zoning" and "interim zoning" are misleading since putting a freeze on
building permits or otherwise preventing all use of land is not zoning, either
interim or stopgap.38 It would be more properly termed a "moratorium"
upon the issuance of a building permit.
39
B. Purpose for Implementing Moratoria Ordinances
The critical question for understanding the significance of moratoria is
determining the purpose for imposing them.40 There are several distinct
reasons why land use planners issue a moratorium ordinance.4' In general,
moratoria are favored as a means to effectively control land use development
and enable the city commission to effectively plan.42 Politicians like the
idea of being permitted to halt all development when they are faced with a
developer who proposes a "distasteful project" or a project which will face
32. Id. at 846 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
33. Mayor Built Homes v. Town of Steilacoom, 564 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that rezoning ordinance was not an interim zoning ordinance since there was no reference
to an emergency situation).
34. Rojas, supra note 8, at 717.
35. Id.
36. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Linda Bozung & Deborah J. Alessi, Recent Developments in Environmental Preservation
and the Rights of Property Owners, URB. LAW., Fall 1988, at 969, 1012.
42. Id
278
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significant opposition from the local community.4 3 The use of a moratorium
ordinance to stop a particular project, however, is of "dubious legal validity"
and frequently challenged in court.4 4
An additional, possibly less controversial, purpose behind a land use
moratorium is the city's desire to preserve the status quo because of an
implementation of a comprehensive plan or a plan revision.45 In order to
control the increasing urbanization and preserve the environment, most
states have adopted a comprehensive plan.46 All land use development
subsequent to the adoption of the plan must be consistent with the
comprehensive plan and ensuing land use regulations.47 A comprehensive
zoning plan is often very complicated and it usually takes a large amount of
effort and time to work out the details. 48 It would obviously destroy the plan
if, during the interim period when the plan was being developed and
implemented, parties seeking to evade the operation of the plan were
permitted to go through a path of construction which might possibly defeat,
in whole or in part, the ultimate execution or purpose of the future plan.49
Preserving the status quo during the creation and implementation of a
comprehensive plan is one of the most popular reasons given for imposing a
land use moratorium ordinance because there is a genuine need to preserve
the status quo by curtailing sudden surges in building and rezoning
activity.50 It is possible that these last minute building permits might
undercut a pending or proposed land use plan.5 1  A moratorium on
development activity protects the planning process by deterring the
establishment of uses that might be legal but would be inconsistent with the
needs that the city has identified through its studies.52
43. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 5.
44. Id.
45. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 41, at 1013.
46. Id. at 969.
47. Id.
48. Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 388 (Cal. 1925); see also Collura v. Town of
Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Mass. 1975) (approving a two-year moratorium on apartment
construction).
49. Miller, 234 P. at 388; see also Collura, 329 N.E.2d at 737.
50. Thaddeus R. Ailes, Not in My Backyard: A Critique of Current Indiana Law on Land Use
Moratoria, 72 IND. L. J. 809, 817 (1997); see also Shafer v. City of New Orleans, 743 F.2d 1086
(5th Cir. 1984) (upholding a moratorium ordinance on land use development in order to preserve the
status quo while studying the area and its needs); State ex rel. SCA Chem. Waste Services, Inc. v.
Konigsberg, 636 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1982) (stating that the authority to enact an interim zoning
ordinance to preserve the status quo until a new comprehensive zoning ordinance becomes effective
is included in the city's broad legislative power).
51. Ailes, supra note 50, at 817.
52. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 5.
When developers, or the public in general, learn that the city is about to
make a zoning change or conduct studies to determine which changes should
be made, development activity is often triggered. 3  This triggered
development is referred to as the "race for diligence." 54 Landowners and
developers want to beat the imposition of new restrictions or controls the
city is about to impose.5 It is true that time will not always allow for the
completion of a developer's or landowner's project; however, if a developer
or landowner can obtain a building permit before the restriction is legalized
or made final, a vested right to continue is generally created, assuming the
landowner or developer has made substantial expenditures in good faith.
5 6
One land use critic noted:
[M]unicipalities should not be handcuffed when dealing with uses
of land which they just had not contemplated. In other words, a
community should not have to be burdened forever with an
undesired land use just because the local government did not have
time to go through the lengthy process of enacting a comprehensive
plan and zoning ordinance before the developer applied for a
building permit. The local government should be able to preserve
the status quo while it goes through the procedures which
[statutory] law requires for the enactment of a zoning ordinance.
Only if municipalities have this ability will they be able to
effectively determine just what gets put in their backyards. 7
The race for developers to acquire building permits and beat the
enactment of a new zoning ordinance is not in the best interest of either the
community or individual property owners. 8 Thus, moratoria ordinances are
enacted to prevent last minute building permits from being issued which
would possibly frustrate the city. planners' efforts and quite possibly be
inconsistent with the public needs the city ultimately identified by its
planning studies. 9
Moratoria ordinances also provide an opportunity for increased public
participation and public debate. 60 This is a persuasive reason for permitting
land use moratorium ordinances because there are significant benefits from
permitting and encouraging a democratic discussion and participation by
citizens and developers in drafting long-range land use plans for the
53. Id.
54. Ailes, supra note 50, at 817.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 810.
58. Id. at 817.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 816.
280
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community.61 A city planning commission is designed to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, and moratoria ordinances allow
time for public debate on the issues, goals, and policies of city planning.62
Discussion of the impact of impending land use ordinances help city
planners design plans that indeed protect the public welfare.63 Putting a
freeze on development can allow a community to institute "democratic
discussion, which is becoming increasingly essential to public
involvement. '64  "The planning process can thus be brought out into the
open for full democratic debate and citizen participation, thereby assuring a
greater relationship between the laws and planning policies and the real
goals and needs of the people.
' 65
Another viable purpose behind the issuance of a moratorium is the city's
desire to preserve the status quo because of a public facilities crisis.66 There
are times when a moratorium needs to be issued to prevent a public facilities
crisis from spiraling out of control.67 The two primary reasons given for a
service facilities moratorium are sewage treatment and water supply
facilities crises. 6' Although there have been a variety of challenges to these
moratorium efforts, sewer moratoria have generally been upheld if the city
can demonstrate a true lack of capacity such as a lack of ability of the local
government to allow sewer hookups.69
61. Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819, 825 (Minn. 1976) (upholding a six-month
moratorium ordinance and stating that moratorium ordinances are valuable tools in keeping open a
municipality's planning options and permitting the county planning office to seek assistance in
preparing a comprehensive plan to meet the needs of the public).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Freilich, supra note 15, at 172.
65. Ailes, supra note 50, at 816.
66. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 5.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Triple G. Landfills, Inc. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 774 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Ind.
1991) (holding that county ordinance placing limits on sanitary landfill was preempted by state law),
affd, 977 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992); Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 776 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D.
Ind. 1990), aff'd, 956 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 57 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1995); Wincamp P'ship
v. Anne Arundel County, 458 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1978) (holding that in absence of a showing by
the landowners of nuisance or menace to health, or any danger of water pollution resulting from
failure of county to expand sewage treatment plant, Secretary of Heath did not abuse his discretion
in not ordering the expansion); Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976) (upholding a local zoning ordinance which prohibited the
issuance of any further residential building permits in the municipality until local sewage disposal
complied with specified standards); Robert T. Foley Co. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 389
A.2d 350 (Md. 1978) (holding that a moratorium on a sewage service charge was not
unconstitutional); Charles v. Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 1295 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that landowner could
develop his own private sewer system, but requiring the landowner to hook up the sewer system
A city may additionally enact a land use moratorium in order to avoid a
non-conforming use. 70 Non-conforming uses are often the thorn in a city
planner's side.7' Depending on the jurisdiction, city planners are often
required to treat a non-conforming use as a vested right as long as the
landowner does not alter the use. 72 If a landowner has established a non-
conforming use prior to the enactment of a moratorium ordinance, he or she
will be permitted to continue with his or her use despite the ordinance.73
While this is beneficial for a landowner who has relied on this use, it is often
troubling for planners who have determined that this non-conforming use is
no longer beneficial for the public as a whole.74 Thus, for jurisdictions that
allow amortization for non-conforming uses, a land use moratorium is an
appropriate way to prevent non-conforming uses that might prevent the
comprehensive zoning plan from continuing.75
One final purpose behind the enactment of a land use moratorium is the
city's desire to control the community development during comprehensive
planning to eliminate the incentive of hasty planning.76 This purpose is
similar to the first purpose identified, however, moratoria, under this
justification, have the effect of allowing a local government to take
essentially complete control of land use development within its governing
boundaries on a temporary basis pending the construction and adoption of a
new plan.77 Not only does the moratorium prevent a landowner from
creating a use that is incompatible with a future land use plan, but, in this
instance, a city is permitted to in fact enact a comprehensive plan which it
has determined will benefit the public. 78 If local governments did not have
the power to enact a moratorium ordinance, they may be forced to enact
restrictive permanent controls in the shortest time possible in order to limit
the number of intervening uses that might not conform to the new plan or
would be unconstitutional).
70. See Gougleman, supra note 25, at 5.
71. Id. at 6.
72. City of Sugar Creek v. Reese, 969 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that anon-
conforming use means a use of land that lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning
ordinance and which is maintained after the effective date of the ordinance even though not in
compliance with use restrictions).
73. Stratos v. Town of Ravenel, 376 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a
landowner could not avoid a moratorium on mobile homes because he merely contemplated that use
of the property prior to the enactment of the moratorium ordinance).
74. Reese, 969 S.W.2d at 893.
75. Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. 1976) (holding that a property
owner who takes steps to develop his land in accordance with a zoning ordinance but is denied a
building permit due to a land use moratorium may have a non-conforming use and may be permitted
to devote his property to the non-conforming use if the property owner has shown that he suffered
undue, unnecessary, and substantial hardship as a result of the municipality's delay).
76. Ailes, supra note 50, at 816-17.
77. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 6.
78. Id.
[Vol. 30: 273, 2003] Land Use Moratoria
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
zoning ordinance enacted. 79 "This hasty process decreases the chances for a
thorough public airing of proposed legislation. 80 Moratoria ordinances can
eliminate the need or desire for hasty adoption of permanent controls.8' If
the local municipality has the ability to preserve the status quo, there is no
incentive to hurry through the planning process.82 While this purpose seems
a little one-sided and appears to overlook landowners who have a vested
right, different jurisdictions have concluded that the local government's
control over development is so complete that it need not be concerned with
the establishment of vested rights.83  Courts and land use scholars
acknowledge that a need exists for systematic and organized development
and for the support of the county planning office in preparing a
comprehensive plan to meet the needs of the community in a practical and
reasonable manner. 84 Accordingly, it is not wholly unreasonable for a town
to resort to a moratorium that would prevent developers from building and
possibly affecting the growth and quality of a community for an indefinite
period in the future and give the town a chance to seek the expertise of
professional planners to create, adopt, or amend a comprehensive zoning
system.8 Therefore, the primary purpose for implementing a land use
moratorium is to allow comprehensive planning to proceed.86
In short, a city is permitted to engage in comprehensive planning
through enacting a land use moratorium because it is permitted to adopt a
comprehensive plan or a major plan revision, make significant changes to its
zoning or land use development regulations, and deal with crisis conditions
such as a lack of ability to treat sewage.87 The enactment of moratorium
ordinances is a recognized, logical tool for the local governmental planning
commissions during periods of creation or revision of a comprehensive
plan.88
79. Ailes, supra note 50, at 816.
80. Id. at 816-17.
81. Id. at 817.
82. Id.
83. Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council of Honolulu, 606 P.2d 866 (Haw. 1980) (upholding
city's action in reversing a prior approval of a variance and modifying an interim zoning ordinance,
even though the developers spent substantial sums of money for planning and design of housing
project in reliance on city council's actions, and developers acted in good faith with respect to the
city's actions).
84. Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819, 825 (Minn. 1976).
85. Id.
86. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 6.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Cappture Realty Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 313 A.2d 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1973) (holding that a moratorium ordinance prohibiting construction on flood plain areas was
C. Litigious Versus Non-Litigious Moratoria Ordinances
Just as there are diverse purposes behind land use moratoria, there are
also different types of moratoria ordinances that are in use today.8 9 There
are various types that have been litigated and inherently present
constitutional challenges.90  There are also types that are not typically
challenged and raise little to no concern among developers and
landowners.9'
The most frequent type of moratoria ordinances that have been litigated
are moratoria on the issuance of building permits in general.92 These types
are frequently known as temporary moratoria. 93 In State ex rel. SCA
Chemical Waste Services, Inc. v. Konigsberg,94 the court argued that a
"municipality may properly refuse a building permit for a land use in a
newly annexed area when such use is repugnant to a pending and later
enacted zoning ordinance. 95 This court, along with other jurisdictions, has
upheld temporary moratorium ordinances as long as they were enacted
pursuant to specific standards.96 There is significant case law on various
types of temporary moratoria issued by legislative bodies and litigated by
landowners.97
Moratoria ordinances focused on the issuance of building permits for
specific uses are another frequently litigated moratoria. 98 The specific use
most popularly targeted is a building permit moratorium ordinance for
multifamily residential development.99  Building permit moratoriums,
however, are not limited to residential development; they may be used to
prevent the use of many specific things.'00 Moratoria have been issued to
reasonable in order to complete construction of flood control projects where the health, safety, and
welfare of the public was involved), aff'd, 336 A.2d 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
89. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 3-4.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 636 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1982).
95. Id. at 436.
96. Id. at 435; see also Taylor v. City of Little Rock, 583 S.W.2d 72 (Ark. 1979) (upholding a
city zoning ordinance where the city complied with statute requirements); Almquist v. Town of
Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 1976) (upholding a six-month moratorium ordinance because it
was enacted pursuant to proper procedural requirements); Sherman v. Town of Reavis, 257 S.E.2d
735 (S.C. 1979) (holding that an ordinance is legal if the governing body has advertised to the public
its intention to hold public hearings on the rezoning matter).
97. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 3.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also Real Estate Dev. Co. v. City of Florence, 327 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Ky. 1971)
(holding that issuing an injunction preventing the city from enforcing a moratorium resolution would
enjoin the city's authority to exercise its legislative discretion).
100. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 3.
284
[Vol. 30: 273, 2003] Land Use Moratoria
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
prevent cellular towers,'0 ' adult bookstores,10 2 mobile home parks,10 3 nursing
homes, 10 4  video arcades,'0 5  livestock operations,'
0 6  billboard signs, 10 7
apartment dwellings,'0 8 recycling businesses,i09 time-share units,' 0 and fast
food restaurants."'
101. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 624 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (upholding
cellular company's motion for summary judgment stating that the local law was not a valid exercise
of the village's police or zoning powers and the moratorium was thus invalid); see also Nat'l
Telecomm. Advisors, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Selectmen of W. Stockbridge, 27 F. Supp. 2d 284 (D. Mass.
1998) (holding that a six-month moratorium on issuance of special use permits for wireless
communications facilities was reasonable). But see Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F.
Supp. 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (striking down a moratorium prohibiting the processing of rezoning or
zoning applications and issuance of building permits for cellular towers because the commission
failed to comply with procedural requirements).
102. Deighton v. City Council of Colorado Springs, 902 P.2d 426 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)
(overruling summary judgment in favor of the city council and holding that the moratorium had the
effect of amending, suspending and repealing a zoning ordinance which could only be done by
enactment of another ordinance); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 44
(1986) (discussing a moratorium on the licensing of businesses whose primary purpose was showing
sexually explicit materials).
103. Plaza Mobil and Modular Homes, Inc. v. Town of Colchester, 639 F. Supp. 140, 145 (D.
Conn. 1986) (stating that a local municipality was authorized to exercise regulatory power over
mobile home parks and was permitted to enact a mobile park moratorium), aff'd, 810 F.2d 1160 (2d
Cir. 1986).
104. Jay Alexander Manor, Inc. v. Novello, 727 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding
that defendant had the authority as the Commissioner of Health of the State of New York to impose
a temporary moratorium on a construction company's application to construct a nursing home),
appeal denied, 767 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y. 2002); First Baptist Church of Crown Heights Ctr. for Nursing
& Rehab., Inc. v. Novello, 728 N.Y.S.2d 881, 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding that a moratorium
violated plaintiff corporation's due process rights), rev'd, 747 N.Y.S2d 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
105. Redeb Amusement, Inc. v. Township of Hillside, 465 A.2d 564, 573 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1983) (upholding a temporary moratorium on coin-operated machines as a valid exercise of the
municipality's police power).
106. Matzke v. Block, 542 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Kan. 1982) (holding that landowner was entitled to
preliminary injunctive relief against foreclosure upon her land, chattels, or livestock for delinquency
in repayment of loan where record did not reflect that any consideration was ever given to
circumstances beyond landowner's control under moratorium provision of Act authorizing Secretary
of Agriculture to "forego foreclosure" and to defer principal and interest), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
732 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984); Schooleraft Egg, Inc. v. Schoolcraft Township, 2000 WL 33409627,
at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2000) (per curium) (upholding a building permit moratorium for
intensive livestock operations stating that it was a means to protect public welfare).
107. City of Roswell v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 549 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. 2001) (upholding a one-month
moratorium prohibiting billboards exceeding a specific size because it was enacted as an emergency
measure to preserve the status quo while city prepared a new sign ordinance).
108. Collura v. Town of Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733 (Mass. 1975) (upholding a two-year
moratorium on construction of apartment buildings as a reasonable zoning provision enacted within
the scope of a general zoning enabling act).
109. Q.C. Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F. Supp. 1331 (D. R.I. 1986) (holding building moratorium on
construction was a taking of developer's property without due process of law because it was a
constitutionally inappropriate response to problem with inadequate sewer line), aff'd, 836 F.2d 1340
(1st Cir. 1987).
285
Another form of moratorium ordinances on building permits is initiated
by the lack of service facilities such as sewage treatment plants." 12 At times,
moratoria ordinances on new sewer plant authorizations or sewer/waste
facility hookups are necessary to prevent the discharge of raw and
inadequately treated sewage into local waterways." 3 State statutes generally
give environmental enforcement agencies authority to address public health
and safety risks caused by sewage treatment and disposal systems and, thus,
enact sewer hook-up moratoria." 4 The Clean Water Act gives the federal
government the ability to impose moratoria as well since wastewater
treatment facilities are within the Act's coverage and have been classified as
a federal concern." 5 Moratorium ordinances are generally created to prevent
public harm, alleviate sewage overflow, and protect the natural character of
the water in the state."16 Sewage overflow and contaminated waters result
from an inability of existing treatment plants to handle all sewage, and
moratoria are generally upheld as a valid exercise of municipalities' police
power. 117 While these moratoria ordinances are established for the health
and safety of the public, their adverse effects are a matter of concern since
the moratorium ordinances essentially cause a virtual standstill in the
construction of sewer facilities." 8 Regardless, sewer hook-up moratoria
ordinances are usually upheld if the restrictions are determined to be a
reasonable means to prevent pollution by sewage overflow and prevent the
epidemics of disease that flourish under such conditions. 19
Just as there are types of moratoria ordinances that have flooded the
legal system, there are types that have not been litigated. 2 ° Moratorium
ordinances on the consideration of requests for rezoning regulations such as
changes in land use designation in a comprehensive plan, special exceptions,
and applications for development approval (ADA) or development of
regional impact (DRI) are a few examples which have been overlooked by
110. Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 665 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. La.
1987) (upholding a moratorium on time-share plans in certain zoning districts).
11. Schafer v. City of New Orleans, 743 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding a moratorium
ordinance prohibiting the issuance of building permits for fast-food restaurants until the city
completed a study of the area).
112. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 5.
113. Robert T. Foley Co. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 389 A.2d 350, 355 (Md. 1978)
(holding that a moratorium on a sewerage service charge was not unconstitutional).
114. Jeffery J. Matthews, Clean Water Act Citizen Suit Requests for Municipal Moratoria:
Anatomy of a Sewer Hookup Moratorium Law Suit, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 25, 37-38 (1999).
115. Id.at25.
116. Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369, 1382 (D. Md.
1975) (upholding a sewer hook-up moratorium ordinance).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1383-84.
120. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 3.
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litigants.' 2' Other regulations such as site plan approval, plat approval,
annexation, and approval of a project having a significant impact on a
community have been used by local land use planning commissions but have
not raised constitutional challenges from property owners or developers.'22
D. State's Power to Enact Moratoria Ordinances
It is unclear where the power to enact a moratorium ordinance
originates. Jurisdictions often grant local planning commissions the power
to pass the controversial ordinances, but jurisdictions are not in accord as to
where the power derives from.
113
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for instance, stated that the power to
impose a moratorium, which suspends land development, is a power distinct
from, and not incidental to, any power to regulate land development. 2 4 The
Tennessee Supreme Court, on the other hand, stated that the power to enact a
moratorium ordinance is included within the broad sweep of the state's
legislative power. 25 California has conferred broad police powers on local
governments to regulate the use of land within their jurisdictions, and courts
have been willing to uphold the moratorium ordinances if they bear a
rational relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
26
Other jurisdictions have granted planners the power to create moratorium
ordinances absent express language in the municipality's enabling acts. 127
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 18.
124. Naylor v. Township of Hellam, 773 A.2d 770 (Pa. 2001) (stating that the power to impose a
moratorium on subdivision approvals while the municipality revises its comprehensive zoning plan,
if not implicitly granted under the municipality's planning code, must be expressly granted in the
municipality's enabling act).
125. State ex rel. SCA Chem. Waste Services, Inc. v. Konigsberg, 636 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1982)
(upholding the city planning commission's power to construct a moratorium ordinance to preserve
the status quo until a new zoning ordinance became effective); see also Collura v. Town of
Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Mass. 1975) (upholding the power to enact a "reasonable" land use
moratorium ordinance, holding that the ordinance was within the scope of the general zoning
enabling act, and stating that the adoption of a two-year moratorium on the construction of apartment
buildings in certain areas was within the broad power of the town).
126. Rojas, supra note 8, at 716.
127. Arnold Bernhard & Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Westport, 479 A.2d 801 (Conn.
1984) (upholding a nine month moratorium on accepting and granting applications for business
development because it was within the power delegated to the planning and zoning commission); see
also Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit, 491 A.2d 564 (Me. 1985) (stating municipalities had the power to
enact moratorium ordinances if they were faced with emergency situations); Collura, 329 N.E.2d at
737; Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 1976); McDonald's Corp. v. Village of
Elmsford, 549 N.Y.S.2d 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding a moratorium on fast-food restaurants
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Each jurisdiction's conclusion generally rests on its individual state's
constitution, statutes, and case law.128  Regardless of the jurisdiction's
justifications, most jurisdictions are reluctant to determine that a moratorium
ordinance, permanent or temporary, is beyond the power of the local
planning commission. 1
29
III. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Procedural Requirements for Plaintiffs
There are significant constitutional challenges which arise with land use
moratorium ordinances facially and as applied to specific landowners .
30
While the Court has determined that moratoria ordinances are facially valid
as long as they are drafted according to state procedural requirements and do
not violate constitutional rights, there are still challenges which can be
brought as to specific moratorium implementations.' 3' There are certain
requirements that a city must meet in order for a moratorium ordinance to be
legitimate.'32
Initially, in order to challenge any zoning ordinance, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he or she has standing.'33 Courts decide only cases or
controversies they have jurisdiction to hear. 34  "In order to satisfy the
constitutional requirement[,] ... [a] plaintiff must show that he [or she] has
a 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,' or that he [or she] has
suffered 'some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively
illegal action.""" "At the federal level, the 'case or controversy'
was a valid exercise of the village's police power); Ford v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 924 P.2d
91 (Wyo. 1996) (holding that counties have broad authority to require compliance with zoning
provisions to promote orderly development).
128. Naylor, 773 A.2d at 772.
129. Konigsberg, 636 S.W.2d at 435-36 (stating that the local government could enact a
moratorium ordinance because it was included within the broad sweep of legislative power). But see
Schrader v. Guilford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 418 A.2d 93 (Conn. 1980) (finding a moratorium
ordinance invalid since there was no statutory authority for such a moratorium); N.J. Shore Builders
Ass'n v. Mayor of Middletown, 561 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (refusing to uphold a
six-month moratorium because evidence did not support finding of clear and imminent danger to the
health of the municipality's inhabitants); Naylor, 773 A.2d at 775.
130. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 8.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Id.
133. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)
(holding that the question of standing in federal courts is to be considered in the framework of
Article Ill of the United States Constitution, which restricts judicial power to cases and
controversies).
134. Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petuluma, 522 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir.
1975).
135. Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) and Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
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requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution translates into
satisfaction of the 'injury in fact' test," which asks if the challenged
ordinance or regulation causes an injury in fact to the plaintiff.'36 An injury
is determined broadly and is not limited to an economic injury to the
plaintiff. 137
A plaintiff might also be required to satisfy an "additional court-
imposed standing requirement that the 'interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."" 3 8  A
"'plaintiff generally must assert his [or her] own legal rights and interests"'
as well. 139 A plaintiff cannot rest his or her claim on the interests or injuries
of a third party if the plaintiff does not have a significant interest at stake
him or herself. 1
40
Standing, however, may differ depending on a state statute. There is a
general trend toward enlarging the class of people who may protest
administrative actions. 142  In Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit,143 the Supreme
Court of Maine simplified the standing requirement, stating that a plaintiff
may satisfy the standing prerequisite if the challenging party "possess[es]
sufficient 'title, right or interest' in the land to confer upon him [or her]
lawful power to use it or to control its use."'
144
As a general rule, a plaintiff must also exhaust the administrative
remedies available to him or her before the plaintiff can challenge a zoning
action or regulation in court. 14  This is often a hurdle for many plaintiffs.
46
The vast majority of takings cases, for example, are dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds such as ripeness. 147 If a plaintiff does not exhaust all
of his or her administrative remedies, a court will not have jurisdiction over
614, 617 (1973)).
136. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 21.
137. Id.
138. Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County, 522 F.2d at 903 (quoting Camp, 397 U.S. at 153).
139. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
140. Id.
141. Camp, 397 U.S. at 154.
142. Id.
143. 491 A.2d 564 (Me. 1985).
144. Id. at 567 (quoting Walsh v. City of Brewer, 315 A.2d 200, 207 (Me. 1974)).
145. City of Gadsden v. Entrekin, 387 So. 2d 829, 832 (Ala. 1980) (holding that the application of
the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is well established in the law).
146. Stephen J. Eagle, Development Moratoria, First English Principles, and Regulatory Takings,
ENVTL. L. REP., Oct. 2001, at 11232.
147. Id.
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the challenge because it is not ripe for review.148  "The ripeness doctrine
serves the purpose of avoiding premature adjudication of administrative
actions."' 149 A constitutional challenge to a moratorium ordinance is ripe
when a property owner or developer has acquired the planning commission's
"final, definitive position" regarding how the commission will apply the
challenged ordinance or regulation to the particular land in question.' 50
Typically for a decision to be final, the landowner or developer "must have
submitted one formal development plan.' 151 Some state statutes will also
require that a landowner or developer has sought a variance from the
regulation if the formal development plan was denied before the court will
assume jurisdiction. 52 In these instances, states will sometimes require the
landowner to do more than submit one proposal or one application for
variance and receive the planning board's denial thereto before the claim is
ripe for adjudication because "[l]and use planning is not an all-or-nothing
proposition."'' 53 The denial of a particular plan does not necessarily equate
to a refusal to permit "any" development. 54 An applicant must receive the
board's "final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations
at issue to the particular land in question."' 55  A court cannot determine
whether a regulation has gone too far unless it knows how far that regulation
goes.'5 6 The court is unable to resolve that issue until it can be certain how
the planning board will apply the zoning ordinance to the landowner's
property. '57
There are exceptions to the ripeness doctrine that permit a plaintiff to
continue his or her suit without exhausting all administrative remedies.' 58
148. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172, 191 (1985) (reversing a jury verdict awarding damages for temporary taking because the verdict
was premature, as the plaintiff had not yet obtained a final judgment regarding the application of a
zoning ordinance).
149. Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
substantive due process challenge was not ripe inasmuch as owners had never submitted formal
development plans nor filed for a specific plan application).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Williamson County Reg' Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at. 188-89.
153. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 347 (1986) (holding that the
Court could not determine whether a taking had occurred in the absence of a final and authoritative
determination by the county planning commission because the commission had to determine how it
would apply the challenged regulation to the property in question before the claim became ripe).
154. Id. at 350.
155. Id. at 351.
156. Id. at 348-49.
157. Id.
158. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir.
1990) (stating that the landowners' failure to seek a variance did not affect the ripeness of their
regulatory taking claim challenging the application of the city's land use regulations to proposed
development of ocean-front property because the landowners had submitted a formal development
application that the city had rejected, and the city did not dispute that applying for a variance from
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One recognized exception is known as the "futility exception," which states
that a development plan does not need to be resubmitted and denied if the
action would be "idle or futile."1 59
If the plaintiff establishes standing and the claim is ripe, then the Court
has the ability to review the challenged moratorium ordinance.1 60
B. Standard of Review
Land use moratorium ordinances are viewed in the same way as other
zoning regulation ordinances.' 6' Moratorium ordinances are given a
presumption of validity because they are legislative decisions, and
legislative decisions on zoning matters are generally given deference by the
court.1 62  A local land use restriction lies within the authority of a
municipality's police power if it is reasonably related to the public
welfare. 63 The court's role is to determine if there was a reasonable basis
for the legislative body to enact the moratorium. 64 If the court determines
that the moratorium ordinance has no reasonable basis and the legislative
body acted "arbitrarily, capriciously, or with unreasonable conduct," the
moratorium will be invalidated as an improper use of the police power. 165
Unfortunately for the landowner, it takes egregious facts to demonstrate that
a legislative body acted arbitrarily; thus, moratorium ordinances and other
land use regulations are rarely found unconstitutional under the improper use
of a municipality's police power standard.
66
C. Procedural Requirements for Drafting Moratoria Ordinances
Even though there are numerous opinions supporting moratoria
ordinances, few legislatures or courts have addressed the criteria for drafting
zoning regulations would have been futile since nature and density of proposed development
conflicted with express terms in the city's zoning ordinances and its general land use plan), aff'd,
526 U.S. 687 (1999).
159. Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1994).
160. See Gougleman, supra note 25, at 21.
161. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976) (stating that
a moratorium ordinance would be constitutional if it was reasonably related to the welfare of the
region affected and moratorium ordinances sustain a presumption of constitutionality under the
police powers).
162. See id. at 483.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 488-89.
a moratorium ordinance.'6 7 Certain jurisdictions have established specific
criteria for drafting a moratorium ordinance, and the ordinance will be
invalidated if the criteria are not satisfied. 6  The various jurisdictions that
have established certain procedural requirements have done so because
moratoria ordinances impose such severe limitations on the uses of the
property they affect, and, if there were no guidelines in drafting the
ordinances, a local government could easily abuse its power and
discretion. 169  Although most moratorium ordinances are temporary in
nature, some serve as "permanent, hasty control[s] usually designed to avoid
comprehensive planning."' 70 Additionally, jurisdictions have required that
the ordinance be drafted carefully due to the ever-increasing concern that the
moratorium ordinance may cause an unconstitutional taking if it imposes an
unreasonable delay. 171
The Minnesota Supreme Court has established a five-factor test for
determining the validity of moratorium ordinances, and a plaintiff can have
the ordinance nullified if the moratorium ordinance is not enacted pursuant
to the requirements. 7 2 The court stated that the test is to be analyzed on an
ad hoc factual basis.'73 First, in order for the moratorium ordinance to be
upheld it must be adopted in good faith. 174  The good faith factor is "a
question of fact and hinges on demonstrated facts showing the need for a
moratorium."1 75  Public hearings and expert testimony supporting the
moratorium should be included in the ordinance and will serve as a
demonstration of facts showing the need for the moratorium ordinance.
76
Testimony by the city-planning director is especially important because
special weight is given to statements made by the city's planning
executives. 77  The director's testimony is considered expert testimony
because the director is in the position to see what the needs for the public
are. 178
The second factor requires that the ordinance must be non-
discriminatory. 179 One question before the court in determining whether the
ordinance is non-discriminatory is determining whether the effect of the
167. See Gougleman, supra note 25, at 7.
168. Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. 1976) (upholding a six-month
moratorium ordinance because it was enacted pursuant to state procedural requirements).
169. Id.
170. Ailes, supra note 50, at 819; see also Bozung & Alessi, supra note 41, at 1013.
171. Freilich, supra note 15, at 173.
172. Almquist, 245 N.W.2d at 820.
173. See Freilich, supra note 15, at 173.
174. Id.
175. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 7.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. 1976).
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moratorium ordinance has an unjust consequence as to constitute
"'substantial prejudice'" on the landowner.18 0
Third, the ordinance must be of limited duration.' 81 The Court stated
that if the ordinance was not specified as having a limited duration, it would
not be invalid per se.'82 However, it would be evidence of invalidity, and it
would be analyzed with the other factors to determine whether or not the
moratorium was enacted properly. 83  Fourth, the moratorium ordinance
must be appropriate to the development of a comprehensive plan.1 84 Finally,
the city council must act "properly" to adopt the plan.
85
Other jurisdictions have not implemented the factorial analysis that
Minnesota has created, but some have said that, at the least, the ordinance
"must be a reasonable, necessary, and limited response directed at redressing
a genuine crisis or emergency" when the ordinance "interferes with the
enjoyment of property."' 8 6
Even though procedural defects are common, moratoria typically still
"achieve the desired goal of delaying development.' ' 87 For example, even if
a court determines that a moratorium ordinance is legally deficient, the
moratorium ordinance has still prevented landowners from developing for a
specific period of time. 188 A larger obstacle for plaintiffs to overcome is the
considerable cost in challenging an ordinance.' 89 Regrettably, landowners
have traditionally been unable to obtain damage awards for illegal
moratorium ordinances, which means that "illegally adopted moratoria have
been cost free" since the only remedy is typically invalidation.'9" All of this
indicates that the abuse of the moratoria process is rarely corrected.' 9'
Moratoria ordinances may be found to be takings if excessive, and
compensation may be available, but "it is difficult to obtain such relief.'
' 92
180. Id. at 820 (quoting Hawkinson v. County of Itasca, 231 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 1975)).
181. Id. at 826.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 827.
185. Id. The Court did not give any guidance as to what "properly" means or how the standard
would be violated.
186. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 624 N.Y.S.2d 170, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(holding that a local moratorium ordinance was an invalid exercise of the village's police power
because no emergency existed which would justify the moratorium ordinance).
187. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 41, at 1013.
188. Id.
189. Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232.
190. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 41, at 970.
191. Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232.
192. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 41, at 970.
Landowners are often left uncompensated, and moratoria ordinances serve
their desired purpose whether they are legal or illegal.
193
D. The Vested Right Doctrine - A Landowner's Defense
A moratorium ordinance is an "important weapon against the 'race of
diligence' during the planning periods of a zoning ordinance.' 94  As a
result, some jurisdictions permit the retroactive application of a zoning
moratorium regulation in which an application was made prior to the
effective date of the new ordinance.' 95 For jurisdictions that allow this type
of action, consideration must be given as to whether the landowner has
already substantially relied on the prior ordinance by significantly changing
his position. 196
The court must also determine whether the city acted in good faith or
whether the city's actions discriminated against a particular property
owner.' 97 The question is difficult because a landowner often asserts that,
because the moratorium ordinance had not passed at the time he or she
applied for a building permit, he or she should have a vested right to go
forward with his or her proposed development.'98 The city planners, on the
other hand, often contest that the act should, in fact, apply retroactively,
otherwise their future plans could be hindered because the landowner may
simply be trying to beat the clock of the new, and possibly more restrictive,
ordinance.' 99
A vested right is an effective weapon for a property owner against the
imposition of a moratorium ordinance because a landowner is legally
permitted to proceed with his desired development notwithstanding the
imposition of the moratorium if a vested right is established.00 Vested
rights analysis strikes a balance "in a more substantive way between the
interest of [the] government in regulating land use [development] and the
interests of private [landowners] in using their land in a particular way. 20'
The prevailing view is that "no vested right arises merely from the
application for a building permit. '20 2  A minority, countervailing view
193. Id.
194. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 27.
195. Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. 1976); see also Collura v. Town
of Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733 (Mass. 1975) (dealing extensively with the subject of retroactive
zoning and upholding a two year moratorium ordinance).
196. Almquist, 245 N.W.2d at 826.
197. Id. at 825.
198. See id. at 826.
199. Id. at 826-27.
200. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 27.
201. Santa Fe Trail Ranch II, Inc. v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 961 P.2d 785, 788 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that a landowner had no vested right in a developing subdivision).
202. Almquist, 245 N.W.2d at 826.
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disagrees and concludes that a property owner should have his application
adjudicated according to the ordinance in effect at the time of filing unless a
change in ordinance is pending at the time of filing.20 3 The majority rule
creates a higher bar for the plaintiff but does include a limited exception to
alleviate an injured plaintiff.20 4 The majority rule creates a vested right to a
permit "if the permit is unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed and the
elements of equitable estoppel are otherwise present.,
205
To determine if a vested right is ripe, a two-factor test is used by the
court.2 06 First, the court must inquire whether the property owner relied in
good faith on some governmental act or omission.20 7 Second, the court must
determine whether the landowner made a substantial change in his or her
position or incurred expenses to the extent that it would be inequitable and
unjust to terminate the right the property owner has attained.20 8  Thus, to
prevail in a vested rights challenge, a landowner "must show initial approval
by the regulatory body," and he or she must additionally show that he or she
"changed [his or her] position in reliance thereon., 20 9 Only then, when a
landowner's right matures into a vested right, does the landowner earn
protection under constitutional provisions prohibiting the government from
affecting such a right.210
Another widely accepted doctrine that may work against a landowner
seeking to avoid a moratorium on the issuance of building permits is known
as the "pending ordinance doctrine. 2 1' The doctrine maintains that a
building permit may be refused if, at the time of application, an amendment
to a zoning ordinance is pending that would prohibit the use of the land for
which the permit is sought.212
203. W. Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980) (holding that a city was
estopped from enforcing a zoning change prohibitin~g plaintiffs proposed use because plaintiffs
building permit conformed to the zoning ordinance in effect at the time the application was filed and
there were no pending changes in the zoning ordinance which would prohibit the use plaintiff
applied for).
204. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 27.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 28-29.
207. Id. at 29.
208. Id.
209. Santa Fe Trail Ranch 1I, Inc. v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 961 P.2d 785, 788 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1998).
210. Id.
211. Naylor v. Township of Hellam, 773 A.2d 770, 776 (Pa. 2001) (holding that the pending
ordinance doctrine does not apply to applications for subdivisions or land use developments).
212. Id.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
There are certain challenges that may be available to an aggrieved
plaintiff.213 Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons from
state governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.' 1 4  If a moratorium ordinance deprives a person of a
constitutionally protected right or is discriminatory in nature, constitutional
issues are triggered.1 5
A. Due Process Challenge
The Supreme Court stated that it is clear that the Due Process Clause
does not empower the judiciary "to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation. ,,2 16 A large amount of discretion is "vested in the
legislature to determine what the welfare of the public requires and what
measures are necessary to [advance] it." 217  When a state acts under its
police power, it "may lawfully impose ... burdens and restraints on private
rights" if it is necessary to promote the general welfare. 218 Thus, the state's
action carries a strong presumption of constitutionality.2 19 Even though the
legislature's action is presumed valid, it may be invalidated if it violates due
process limitations.2 0 "Because the enactment of a moratorium ordinance is
an exercise of the local government's police power, the ordinance must
satisfy substantive due process limitations imposed on all police power
regulations.',
221
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,222 the Supreme Court stated
that every zoning ordinance, which would by definition include moratoria
ordinances, must serve the "public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. 22 3 Furthermore, the ordinance must be reasonably related to the
valid governmental purpose. 224 This threshold two-prong test is easily met,
213. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 13.
214. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
215. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 13.
216. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)) (stating that the Kansas Legislature was free to decide what legislation is
needed to deal with a specific problem within the state borders).
217. Robert T. Foiley Co. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 389 A.2d 350, 355 (Md. 1978).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 13.
221. Id.
222. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
223. Id. at 395 (conditioning the validity of zoning ordinances on two factors: (1) the zoning
ordinance must advance legitimate public interests and (2) the effect of the ordinance must not be
unreasonable).
224. Id. (holding that if the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes is fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control).
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though, because moratorium ordinances are "clothed with a presumption of
validity" and most are enacted under the "guise of serving the general
welfare."22 5 A landowner opposing a moratorium ordinance is unlikely to
succeed in a due process challenge.226
There are two prongs to the Due Process Clause. 22 7 A litigant may bring
a challenge alleging a substantive due process violation or a procedural due
process violation.228 A substantive due process violation occurs when an
ordinance arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unduly deprives property owners of a
fundamental use, benefit, and control of their property without providing due
229 oreprocess in return. In order to succeed, the litigant must prove three
elements. 230 He or she must demonstrate (1) that the ordinance has no
rational relationship to the public welfare, (2) the ordinance is not
reasonably designed to correct an undesirable condition affecting the public
good, and (3) the ordinance is not fairly debatable. On the other hand, if a
municipality can show that the moratorium in question involves a legitimate
concern and is fairly debatable, it will be found to have met the threshold
requirements of substantive due process. 32 According to Shelton v. City of
College Station,33 the legislative purpose need only be hypothesized, and
the city need not prove its legislative purpose as a "historical fact.,
234
Despite the presumptive validity moratoria ordinances have, one New
York court determined that one particular moratorium ordinance which had
no end date denied the property owners their due process rights "since it
[had] the practical effect of imperiling their projects without providing them
with any redress or mechanism of appeal., 23' The court stated that the
power to delay without limit was essentially the power to destroy a property
owner's rights.236
225. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 13.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Jonathan Brennan Butler, Insurers Under Fire: Assessing the Constitutionality of Florida's
Residential Property Insurance Moratorium After Hurricane Andrew, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731,
742-43 (1995).
230. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 13.
231. Id.
232. Herrington v. City of Pearl, 908 F. Supp. 418, 426 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (holding that a
moratorium against new mobile home sales did not violate litigant's substantive due process rights).
233. 780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1986).
234. Id. at 484.
235. First Baptist Church of Crown Heights Ctr. for Nursing & Rehab. v. Novello, 728 N.Y.S.2d
881, 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
236. Id.
"The second prong of a due process challenge is procedural." '237 Since
moratorium "ordinance enactment is a legislative act," a procedural due
process challenge is often unsuccessful because "courts do not usually
impose constitutional procedural requirements on the legislative process. 238
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 239 the Court argued that when a state
extinguishes property rights through the legislative process, it is said, "the
legislative determination provides all the process that is due., 240 The fact
that the ordinance "'applies across the board provides a 'substitute
safeguard.'
241
The Seventh Circuit, in Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, was
faced with a moratorium ordinance that was allegedly provoked and enacted
because the planning board feared the plaintiffs forthcoming use.242 The
court stated, "where the legislation affects only a tiny class of people," the
procedural process may become more important and more may be required
from the legislative process.243 Despite that statement, the court concluded
that it did not believe that "generally applicable prophylactic legislation
provoked by the fear of one particular actor converts an elected body's
legislative act into a quasi-judicial or administrative act that would require
more process. 244
B. Equal Protection Challenge
The allegation that a zoning moratorium denies equal protection is
another frequent litigation challenge. 245 The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state may deny any person equal
protection of the laws.246 This is, in essence, a command that "all persons
similarly situated are to be treated alike. '247  "[T]he threshold inquiry is
whether the compelling governmental interest test or rational basis test
237. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 14; see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
(1982) (holding that a discharged employee's right to use the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Act's adjudicatory procedures following his discharge on purported ground that his short left leg
made it impossible for him to perform his duties was a species of property protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
238. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 14; see also Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441,445 (1915); United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636, 648 (5th Cir. 1986).
239. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
240. Id. at 433.
241. Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 57 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Philly's v.
Byrne, 732 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1984)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 8.
246. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
247. Herrington v. City of Pearl, 908 F. Supp. 418, 427 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
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should be used to determine whether" the ordinance is valid.2 48 "Attempts to
invoke the compelling governmental interest test in equal protection
challenges to zoning moratoria have been generally unsuccessful.
249
However, the standard is used when the challenge is based on a suspect class
such as race or gender.250 If the rational basis test is used, the court is to
determine if the ordinance serves permissible governmental objectives,
whether the ordinance is rationally related to governmental objectives, and if
the ordinance is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.2  Just as in other
zoning regulations, a permissible governmental objective with a moratorium
ordinance is one that serves the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.
25 2
The Supreme Court of California stated that a temporary moratorium
ordinance did not need to be sustained by a compelling state interest, but
would be constitutional if it was reasonably related to the welfare of the
region it affected. 3  The court further stated that the ordinance had a
presumption of validity under the city's police power test that couldn't be
overcome on the basis of a limited record. 4
In Schafer v. City of New Orleans,255 the Fifth Circuit determined that a
land use moratorium that was aimed solely at fast-food restaurants did not
result in a denial of equal protection to the landowners who sought to sell
their property to a fast-food chain.256 The court did not state whether it was
using the compelling governmental interest test or the rational basis test; it
simply stated that the burden of proof was on the landowner to prove that the
ordinance was unconstitutional, and the landowner failed to meet the
burden.257
C. First Amendment Challenge
A plaintiff may also bring a constitutional challenge against an
ordinance imposing a moratorium if the ordinance is a prior restraint on
248. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 9.
249. Id.; see also Const. Indus.y Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1975).
250. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 9.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 476 (Cal. 1976).
254. Id. at 483-84.
255. 743 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1984).
256. Id. at 1090.
257. Id. at 1090-91.
constitutionally protected speech.258 First Amendment challenges typically
center on moratorium ordinances that thwart adult entertainment businesses
by suspending development or preventing the issuance of entertainment
licenses. 59 In Howard v. City of Jacksonville,60 the court stated that when
courts are faced with moratoria ordinances that prevent the development or
establishment of adult entertainment businesses, the issue for the court to
determine is not what the court thinks about adult entertainment
establishments. 26' Rather, the only issue before the court is whether the
ordinance in question "is an unconstitutional restraint on these types of
businesses in violation of the free speech provision of the First Amendment"
of the Constitution.262 Courts are skeptical of ordinances which place
restrictions on individual speech because "[u]nprincipled, heavy-handed
government policies have the secondary effect of promoting censorship and
sapping the rule of law.,
2 63
In Howard, the city of "Jacksonville require[d] an adult entertainment
license before a business [could] offer adult entertainment in the city. 264
The city then imposed a moratorium ordinance on the issuance or granting
of any licenses permitting the operation of any adult entertainment facilities
in the city.2 65 The city stated that it imposed the moratorium pursuant to its
"police powers to protect the public health, safety, welfare and morals of the
community at large. 266 The moratorium in effect barred adult entertainment
businesses from getting a license for almost six months.267 The operator of a
lounge offering live nude dancing and the owner of a lingerie and gift shop
that sold adult media challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance
claiming that it was a violation of the First Amendment of the
Constitution.268 The court stated that when a city requires a permit to be
"obtained before adult entertainment is allowed [it] constitutes a prior
restraint on speech. 2 69 The court emphasized that a prior restraint is not per
258. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (holding that petitioners could
challenge the validity of an ordinance inhibiting adult entertainment businesses on First Amendment
prior restraint grounds); see also Howard v. City of Jacksonville, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (M.D. Fla.
2000) (issuing a preliminary injunction against a moratorium ordinance on the issuance of adult
entertainment licenses because the ordinance was an invalid restriction on speech).
259. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 220-21; Howard, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-64.
260. 109 F. Supp. 2d. 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
261. Id. at 1363.
262. Id.
263. Id.; see also D'Ambra v. City of Providence, 21 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111 (D.R.I. 1998) (holding
that a city's license moratorium on adult entertainment establishments violated the First Amendment
because the moratorium ordinance was an improper time, place, and manner restriction).
264. Howard, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1363.
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se unconstitutional but "bears a heavy presumption against constitutional
validity. '270  In order for the ordinance to be constitutional, certain
safeguards must be present, including the following:
(i) the restraint cannot place "unbridled discretion" in the hands of a
government official or agency; (ii) any restraint prior to judicial
review may be imposed only for a brief period of time and only for
the purpose of preserving the status quo until the judicial
determination is complete; and, (iii) the ordinance must provide for
judicial review.271
The Howard court determined that the ordinance was an
unconstitutional prior restraint because it did not provide for judicial review
of non-permitting decisions, and it affected all adult entertainment
businesses.272 Thus, the ordinance did not exercise any discretion at all.273
Furthermore, the moratorium failed because it was in effect for an
unreasonable time.274
First Amendment challenges are not as prevalent as due process or
taking challenges, but they may be effective avenues for landowners to
invalidate moratorium ordinances if the ordinances are unconstitutional prior
restraints on the freedom of speech.275
D. Takings Challenge
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution declares that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation. '" 276 The
Constitution implicates a constitutional obligation to pay just compensation
when a government action works a taking of a private individual's property
rights.277 The just compensation requirement guarantees that a "few are not
270. Id.; see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225 (1990); Lady J. Lingerie, Inc.
v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1361-63 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (stating that an ordinance is valid
and is not a violation of the First Amendment "if it is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
government interest, and it allows for reasonable alternative avenues of expression").
271. Howard, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-64; see also FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 225-227; Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (holding that prior restraint is not necessarily unconstitutional
under all circumstances, but a city must provide adequate safeguards against undue inhibition of
protected expression).
272. Howard, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1364.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1363.
276. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
277. Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232.
forced to bear the cost of [the] uses that benefit" society as a whole.278 A
just compensation taking challenge is perhaps the most frequent and
troubling challenge moratoria ordinances face.279
"Before 1922 the Supreme Court required that compensation be paid to
private property owners only when the government engaged in a permanent
physical occupation or invasion of private property. 28 ° In 1922, however,
the Supreme Court handed down an opinion that significantly altered the
future for the takings jurisprudence.28' In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,z82 the Court held a state law was unconstitutional because the law
made "it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal [which had] very
nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or
destroying [the land]. 283  While the Court weighed various factors in
assessing the takings claim in Pennsylvania Coal, it articulated no specific
test for determining when a police power restriction or regulation constitutes
a taking. 84 In the end, it simply noted that, "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if [the] regulation goes too far, it will be
recognized as a taking."2 85  With this observation, the Supreme Court
originated the concept of regulatory takings.286
Despite [the Court's] pronouncement, however, "for the next [fifty-
five] years, the Court did [very] little to elaborate on the concept of
a regulatory taking." Not until 1978, in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,28 7 did the Court articulate a
test for regulatory takings .... [T]he Court identified three primary
factors to be considered while conducting an "ad hoc" evaluation of
whether a police power regulation went "too far" ....
Two years following Penn Central, and without abandoning the test
elaborated in Penn Central, the Court articulated a two-part takings
test in Agins v. City of Tiburon.288  The Court later affirmed the
Agins test in Keystone Bitumious Coal Ass 'n v. DeBendictis.
289
278. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998, 999 (9th
Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
279. Butler, supra note 229, at 742.
280. Dan Herber, Surviving the View Through the Lochner Looking Glass: Tahoe-Sierra and the
Case for Upholding Development Moratoria, 86 MINN. L. REV. 913, 922 (2002).
281. Id.
282. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
283. Id. at 414.
284. Jd. at 415.
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
288. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
289. Herber, supra note 280, at 923-24 (quoting Robert K. Best, Regulatory Takings: A Brief
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The Constitution allows a state to reasonably regulate private property
for the benefit "of the public health, safety or welfare without infringing on
the Fifth Amendment., 290 However, these regulations may not rise to the
level which unduly deprives a property owner of the fundamental right to
use and control property without just compensation in return. 9  It is often
difficult to determine where the line is drawn indicating when the regulation
is a valid exercise of the police power, or when the regulation has unduly
deprived a landowner from constitutionally using his or her land. 92 The line
is blurred because the deprivation need not be direct, but may consist of
regulations which "arbitrarily, unreasonably, and without sufficient public
purpose" rob the owner of the benefits of his or her property.293
Furthermore, the Court has offered nothing more than ad hoc factual tests
that provide little guidance to land owners, developers, city planners, and,
most importantly, the courts.
While the Court has a history of providing little more than ad hoc
factorial analysis, there have been a few instances where the Court has given
some guidance in determining when a government regulation or action
works a taking of individual property rights.294 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,295  the Court established a general rule for governmental
regulations. 296 The Court concluded that the government may regulate
property to a certain extent but "if [the] regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking. 297 To resolve when a regulation has gone "too far"
the Court has created three situations in which a regulatory action may
accomplish a taking that requires compensation. 98 There are two categories
that are "automatically compensable without case-specific examination of
'the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.' '299 The first type of
categorical takings claim involves an actual physical invasion of the
property.3"' This type of taking is rarely claimed in reference to land use
History, in Inverse Condemnation and Related Liability 1, 3-4 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, May
3-5, 2001).
290. Butler, supra note 229, at 742.
291. Id. at 743.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232.
295. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
296. Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232.
297. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
298. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 29.
299. Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).
300. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (finding a taking
when a two-inch cable line was affixed to a piece of property and concluding that there is a per se
303
moratorium ordinances due to the nature of the ordinances.3 °' Moratorium
ordinances serve to prevent land use development for a period of time as
opposed to physically invading the landowner's property.3 °2
The second type of categorical taking entails a regulation or ordinance
that denies a landowner of "all 'economically viable use' of his property.' 30 3
This is because the Court views a total deprivation of all beneficial use as
the equivalent of a physical appropriation of property. 30 4  "This
compensation requirement also guarantees that the government does not do
by regulation what it cannot do through eminent domain - i.e., take private
property without paying for it."'30 5  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, the property owner bought two residential lots on the coast of
South Carolina with the intention of building single-family homes on the
lots. 30 6 Before Lucas was able to develop the property, the state legislature
enacted the "Beachfront Management Act," which effectively banned
permanent construction on Lucas' property.30 7 Lucas sued the South
Carolina Coastal Council for violating the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause. 30 ' The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lucas, asserting that the Act
deprived Lucas of any reasonable use of the lots and made them valueless,
thus, denying Lucas of all economically viable use of his property and
requiring the state to pay him just compensation for the taking of his
property.30 9
The Court, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 310 expanded the holding in Lucas. 31I The Court announced that
a landowner is entitled to just compensation for the taking of his or her
property when the owner is deprived of all economically viable use of his or
her land, even if the taking is merely temporary.31 2
The third type of takings claim was created in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.3 13 This type of analysis asks the court
taking whenever there is an actual physical invasion of property no matter how de minimis).
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. This test is often referred to as simply a Lucas Taking.
304. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998, 999 (9th Cir.
2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
305. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
306. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
307. Id. at 1007.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1020.
310. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
311. See id. at 318; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (stating that the
government regulation must leave the property owner with more than a token interest in his
property).
312. Id. at 322.
313. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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to conduct an ad hoc balancing test which looks at (1) the character of the
governmental action, (2) the economic impact of the regulation, and (3)
whether the regulation interferes with investment backed expectations.
314
Most practitioners are familiar with the type of analysis used in Penn
Central, but its ambiguity causes it to remain a mystery to the members of
the bench and bar.315 If the moratorium ordinance results in a taking under
this analysis, the landowner can obtain compensation for the taking, but the
court does not have to invalidate the moratorium ordinance as a whole.31 6
As a practical point, when a plaintiff challenges a city moratorium
ordinance, he or she should challenge its constitutionality under the per se
taking tests first and, if he or she cannot satisfy either per se test, move to the
Penn Central test.
V. CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE
A crucial step in the takings analysis is defining the property interest at
stake." "Defining the 'property interest' at stake in a takings claim presents
an ongoing challenge for the courts. Judicial outcomes may vary depending
on whether a court adopts an expansive or fragmented view of the plaintiff's
holdings. 3 18 Conceptual severance is "an abstract treatment of property that
allows any one of the classic property rights to be splintered into fragments,
with each segment ... [being] held up by the owner as ... [a] distinct
property right. '31 9 The term "conceptual severance" has been described as
separating the sticks of the bundle that characterize a landowner's property
interests.32 ° Since the birth of the Bill of Rights and the inception of takings
law, the "bundle of sticks" that characterizes a landowner's property interest
has grown more burdensome and unmanageable.32 ' At times, courts have
permitted plaintiffs to split their property interests into spatial, functional,
temporal, or economic units to determine whether a governmental regulation
results in a compensable taking of their property.32   The concept of
"conceptual severance" is especially important in a temporary takings
314. Id. at 124.
315. Gougleman, supra note 25, at 30.
316. Id.
317. Tedra Fox, Lake Tahoe's Temporary Development Moratorium: Why a Stitch in Time Should
Not Define the Property Interest in a Taking Claim, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 399, 406 (2001).
318. Id. at 399.
319. Id. at 404.
320. Id. at 400-01.
321. Id. at 400.
322. Seeid. at411-12.
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analysis because it can make a significant difference in the outcome of the
taking analysis.323 For example, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Ninth Circuit said there was no
taking because all reasonable use had not been denied because substantial
future use remained.3 24 Had the court accepted the plaintiffs' request to
conceptually sever their property interests and agreed that they held distinct,
temporal property interests, the thirty-two month development moratorium
may have been categorized as a taking.325
When a court is faced with a Lucas taking, that court may categorize
conceptual severance as the "denominator dilemma. 3 26  A one-hundred
percent diminution of value is a dispositive taking according to Lucas.
327
This requires a court to compare a landowner's property value after the
challenged regulation has been in place, the numerator, with the property's
value before the regulation was enacted, the denominator.328 The numerator
is generally easy to determine, but the Supreme Court has wrestled with
determining how to define a denominator. 329  The definition of the
denominator is important because if it is defined broadly enough, a taking
may never result, but if it is defined narrowly, it almost always will. 330 The
Court has argued that how a court identifies the denominator can "tilt the
wheel of takings law toward a particular outcome.
331
Federal and state courts have, on occasion, "splintered property interests
into spatial, functional, temporal, or economic units to determine whether a
government action results in [a] taking. 332 The Ninth Circuit, in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
33 3
however, rejected the landowners' request to apply the theory of "conceptual
severance" in a taking analysis. 334 The court refused to allow plaintiffs to
split their land interests into "slices" of time.335 The court stated that the
"taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments"
and then attempt to discern whether these detached, segmented rights have
323. See id. at 407-09.
324. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 781 (9th
Cir. 2000), reh 'g denied, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
325. See Fox, supra note 317, at 413-15.
326. Id. at 405.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 406.
332. Id. at 400-01.
333. 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), reh 'g denied, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
334. Id. at 779.
335. Id. at 774-76.
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been entirely abrogated. 3 6 The Ninth Circuit argued that holding otherwise
would run contrary to the Supreme Court's assertion that Lucas categorical
takings are rare. 337 It also stated that engaging in conceptual severance
would result in a widespread invalidation of temporary moratorium
ordinances and deprive the states and local governments of an "important
land-use planning tool with a well-established tradition. 338
For years, the Supreme Court rejected conceptual severance as a
legitimate form of analysis in regulatory takings cases.339 It argued that
"property interests should be viewed in their entirety., 340  "The Court
reasoned that 'where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights,
the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. ' 34' Dissenting in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, Justice Stevens
stated that governmental zoning regulations are three dimensional, having
characteristics of depth, width, and length, and none of these elements could
be analyzed alone to evaluate the impact of a governmental regulation.342
Likewise, in Penn Central, the Court stated that the plaintiff landowners
could not "force it to focus on the loss of [their] air rights alone in deciding
whether a taking had occurred. 3 43 The Court maintained that the "whole"
parcel of Grand Central Station had to be used to test the validity of the
government regulation that prevented the landowners from utilizing their air
rights.3 " The analysis in Penn Central suggests that the present and future
values or uses of a property are intrinsically tied together and cannot be
viewed separately in a taking analysis.345 Therefore, if there is a loss in
present value, there cannot be a valid compensable taking, even if all the
value of the present use is denied, because the future value or use rights of
the property still exist.
346
336. Id. at 775.
337. Id. at 777.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 774.
340. Fox, supra note 317, at 407.
341. Freilich, supra note 15, at 176-77 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
342. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 330
(1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 41, at 1016-17.
344. Id.at117.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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The conceptual severance question appeared to be settled, but in the late
1980's the Court "breathed new life back into the debate 3 47 with its
decisions in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles348 and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.349 The Court's renewed interest
gave promise to the plaintiffs in the Tahoe-Sierra case facing the Supreme
Court on appeal.35 °
In Palazzolo, the Court carefully stated that the "relevant parcel" issue
was still an unsettled matter. 351  The Court refused to settle the matter,
though, stating:
[The plaintiff] ask[ed] us to examine the difficult, persisting
question of what is the proper denominator in the takings fraction.
Some of our cases indicate that the extent of deprivation effected by
a regulatory action is measured against the value of the parcel as a
whole, but we have at times expressed discomfort with the logic of
this rule .... Whatever the merits of these criticisms, we will not
explore the point here.352
The Court referenced Justice Scalia's footnote in Lucas, wherein Justice
Scalia stated: "[r]egrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule
does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is
to be measured. 353
In First English, the Court affirmed the notion that "a temporal interest
could be treated as the relevant unit of ownership. 354 The Court accepted
the argument that a segment could constitute the "'denominator' of the
'takings fraction' for purposes of takings analysis." 355  Some courts and
scholars have stated that given the First English and Palazzolo affirmation
of temporal segmentation, "it follows that the deprivation of the
economically beneficial use of any temporal segment constitutes a
compensable taking. 356 The Court, however, did not definitively state that
temporal severance was acceptable in a taking analysis.
357
347. Fox, supra note 317, at 402.
348. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
349. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
350. Fox, supra note 317, at 402.
351. Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232.
352. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (citations omitted).
353. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
354. Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Carla Boyd, Temporal Severance and the Exclusion of Time in Determining the Economic
Value of Regulated Property, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 793, 805 (2002).
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Tahoe-Sierra presented a perfect opportunity for the Court to clarify its
118position on conceptual severance-more pointedly temporal severance.
The conceptual severance issue was at the center of the Tahoe decision.359
Unfortunately, the Court's position on the issue is no clearer after Lake
Tahoe than before the controversy. 360 Nor are the courts any more certain
today what the relevant parcel is for purposes of determining whether there
has been a "total taking" than they were before the Tahoe controversy.
36 1
The Tahoe-Sierra majority and dissent did not see eye to eye when it
came to the conceptual severance issue. The majority quoted Penn Central:
"[The] '[t]aking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole. 362
The Court concluded that it has repeatedly affirmed that "when an
owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights," the destruction of one
stick does not constitute a taking.363 The Court stated that the district court
erred in disaggregating the property owner's property into temporal
segments because the court ignored Penn Central's admonition that, in
takings cases, the court must focus on the parcel as a whole.364 The Court
reiterated its rejection of temporal severance, stating "[w]e have consistently
rejected such an approach to the 'denominator' question." 365
The dissent was troubled by the majority's cursory rejection of
conceptual severance considering that it did not even address the Court's
prior approval of the concept in First English.366 The dissent claimed: "I had
thought that First English put to rest the notion that the 'relevant
denominator' is land's infinite life. Consequently, a regulation effecting a
358. Id. at 819.
359. See id.
360. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1496
(2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
361. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 1481 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978)).
363. Id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
364. Id. at 1483.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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total deprivation of the use of a so-called 'temporal slice' of property is
compensable under the Takings Clause .... 367
Despite the Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra, the problems presented in
defining property under the Fifth Amendment are still complex, and "there is
no reason to believe that property can or [ever] will be defined in an all
(always aggregate) or nothing (totally sever) manner., 368  "[D]ividing up
sticks in the bundle and requiring compensation anytime a single stick is
destroyed, is not in accord with Chief Justice Rehnquist's concession in
First English that 'normal delays' would not constitute periods for which
compensation would be due." Thus, if some normal delay is required in the
zoning process, the landowner's "present use [will not be] a severable,
compensable strand, and the mere present inability to use the land" during
the delay will not constitute a taking.369
VI. SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE
The Supreme Court has given considerable attention to the
constitutional validity of zoning ordinances, but it had not given much
guidance as to the constitutionality of moratorium ordinances before its
recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra.370 "The seminal case concerning temporary
takings is the United States Supreme Court's decision in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. '371 "The case
serving as a necessary reference regarding development moratoria is Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council. '3 72  Lucas held that governmental
regulations were compensable takings if they deprived a property owner of
all economically viable use of his or her property.373 Together, First English
and Lucas "state that temporary development regulations that forbid all
economically viable use of property are compensable" takings.374
The events leading up to the Court's First English decision were not as
complex as the facts in Tahoe-Sierra.375 In First English, the First English
Lutheran Church owned a twenty-one acre parcel of property in Los Angeles
County.376 The church constructed recreational facilities on the property,
367. Id.
368. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 41, at 1017.
369. Id. at 1017-18.
370. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037.
371. Wendie L. Kellington, Temporary Takings/Moratoria, SG021 ALI-ABA 105, 107 (2001).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. See Stephen J. Eagle, Temporary Regulatory Takings and Development Moratoria: The
Murky View from Lake Tahoe, ENVTL. L. REP., Feb. 2001, at 10224.
376. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 307
(1987).
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which it used as a camp for a retreat center and a recreation center for
handicapped children.377 The facilities were destroyed by ensuing floods
after a severe forest fire denuded the hills upstream from the camp, causing a
serious flood hazard.378 In response to the flooding damage, the county
prevented the reconstruction or construction of any buildings within that
area. 379 The temporary moratorium ordinance was enacted to preserve the
status quo in order for "the city to study the problem" caused by the fire and
flooding and prevent any more deaths and property damage "due to building
in the floodplain." 380 After three years, the county converted the moratorium
ordinance into a permanent building restriction.381 The church sued the
county for a violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.382 The Ninth
Circuit refused compensation and determined that there was no Lucas or
Penn Central taking violation.383
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding and stated that
the Ninth Circuit could not refuse compensation simply because the
government had invalidated the regulation.384 The Court stated, "[w]e
merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked a
taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which
the taking was effective. 385 The Court stated that temporary takings were
no different than permanent takings for which the Constitution clearly
requires compensation.386 Unfortunately, the opinion had some confusing
and arguably contradictory statements about temporary takings, but it did
suggest that a moratorium ordinance might be a taking if the delay it caused
was unreasonable.387
After First English was decided, it was suggested that the case cast a
shadow over the constitutionality of moratorium ordinances. 388 Shortly after
First English was decided, the New York Court of Appeals cited it in a case
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037.
381. Id.
382. First English, 482 U.S. at 308.
383. See id. at 309.
384. Id. at 321.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 318.
387. Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037.
388. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 41, at 1014.
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involving a takings challenge to a moratorium ordinance. 389  The court
avoided ruling on the takings claim since the moratorium was invalid on
procedural grounds, but its reference to First English demonstrated a need
for the Supreme Court to clarify its First English holding in relation to
moratorium ordinances and temporary takings.39°
Regrettably, neither First English nor the Court's subsequent holdings
have comprehensively defined what constitutes a "temporary regulatory
taking. '391 The Court "recently made the rather casual admission, in City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., that it has yet 'to define with precision
the elements of a temporary regulatory takings claim.' 392 Some critics have
assumed that First English does not suggest that temporary moratorium
ordinances are temporary takings and have stated that there is a difference
between a temporary restriction and a temporary taking.393 Others disagree
and read First English to presume that moratoria ordinances, which are by
definition temporary and which often deny all or most uses, are temporary
takings.394 The Supreme Court of Florida took this interpretation and argued
that absolutely precluding temporary ordinances from treatment under Lucas
would "ignore the drastic economic impacts inflicted by such regulations,
rendering the protections offered by the categorical rule meaningless. 395
The court further stated that it was "unable to discern any meaningful
distinction justifying the preclusion of prospectively temporary regulations
from categorical treatment under Lucas. Moreover, [the court] believe[ed]
this to be the only logical outgrowth of First English.396
The First English Court specifically addressed the temporary nature of
the ordinance because the county aborted the moratorium on development
when the church brought suit.3 97 The Court determined that the temporary
nature of the taking was irrelevant.398 It stated that there was no difference
between a temporary taking which denies a landowner all use of his property
and a permanent taking. 399 The Court stated that once a taking is found, the
government could not retroactively erase what it had done to avoid
payment.400  This view was one Justice Holmes adopted more than fifty
389. Id.
390. Id.at 114-15.
391. Eagle, supra note 375, at 10224.
392. Id. (quoting City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 721
(1999)).
393. Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037.
394. Id.
395. Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 873 (Fla. 2001).
396. Id. at 874.
397. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 317
(1987).
398. Id. at 318.
399. Id.
400. Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232.
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years ago in Pennsylvania Coal, stating "a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change. 4 °1
Subsequently, the Court clarified its holding by stating that when it was
discussing temporary takings, it was not speaking to issues which arise in
the ordinary course of planning, and the "normal delays" which arise in
"obtaining building permits, changes in selling ordinances, variances, and
the like," which were not before the Court in First English.4 °2 However, the
Court did not clarify what it meant by "normal delays," and whether a
temporary moratorium ordinance was included within its definition.40 3
Nonetheless, there was an implication that the exception for "normal delays"
was intended to be a narrow one.40 4
Justice Stevens dissented in First English and disputed that the denial of
economically beneficial use for a substantial period could constitute a
regulatory taking.405 The dissent was concerned that the majority's holding
would mitigate the overall effect of the regulation so substantially that the
slight diminution in value that the regulation caused would be classified as a
compensable taking.40 6
Many lower courts have adopted Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion
and, in turn, ignored and misinterpreted the First English majority view.407
The dissent in the Tahoe-Sierra circuit court opinion accused the majority of
turning its back on Supreme Court takings jurisprudence by overruling the
First English decision.408  The majority's analysis in First English was
targeted by the dissent in Tahoe-Sierra.40 9 The dissent persuasively argued
that a temporary moratorium was in fact a taking, and First English required
just compensation even though the moratorium was temporary. 40  The
majority disagreed with the dissent and stated that, while the temporary
moratorium did prevent the landowners from utilizing their property for
thirty-two months, it was not a significant time in the life of the property.41
401. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
402. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
403. Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232.
404. Id.
405. Eagle, supra note 375, at 10224.
406. Id.
407. Kellington, supra note 371, at 110.
408. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998, 999
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1000-01.
411. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg' Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 781-82 (9th
The dissent in Tahoe-Sierra accused the Ninth Circuit panel of disregarding
the majority in First English and adopting Justice Stevens' dissent: "The
panel does not like the Supreme Court's Taking Clause jurisprudence very
much, so it reverse[d] First English ... and adopt[ed] Justice Steves's First
English dissent."'4 12 The Tahoe-Sierra Court had the opportunity to finally
clear up the confusion it left after its holding in First English, but it failed to
clear up the murky waters it has created.413
First English and Palazzolo have the most bearing on the interpretation
of what constitutes a temporary taking.414 The Palazzolo v. Rhode Island'15
opinion is problematic in determining what constitutes a denial of all
"economically viable use" of one's property. 16 In Palazzolo, the Court
stated that the government's regulation must leave the landowner with more
than a token interest.4 17 The Court argued that a regulation which leaves the
land with some value will still require the government to pay the landowner
compensation; however, the Court's holding demonstrates that a token
interest is defined very narrowly.418
In Palazzolo, the plaintiff/landowner owned approximately eighteen
acres of predominately tidal saltmarsh wetland on the inland side of a barrier
beach in Rhode Island.419 In 1971, the State of Rhode Island created the
Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) to regulate coastal
wetlands under the terms of CRMC Plan.42° Palazzolo attempted to develop
the eighteen acre property, and he requested permission from the CRMC to
build a wooden bulkhead along the shore of his property and fill the entire
marshland area.42 ' The Council rejected the application stating that it was
too vague, and the land was inadequate for a project of its size and nature. 22
Palazzolo then submitted another application to build a private beach club on
the property, but this proposal was denied because it did not serve a
compelling public purpose.423 Palazzolo sued, claiming that the regulation
had resulted in a total taking of all economically viable use of his
property. 24 Palazzolo claimed that since he was unable to build in the
Cir. 2000), reh 'g denied, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
412. Tahoe-Sierra, 228 F.3d at 999 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citation
omitted).
413. Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037..
414. See Freilich, supra note 15, at 163-77.
415. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
416. See Freilich, supra note 15, at 165.
417. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-31.
418. See id.
419. ld. at 614.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 615.
424. Id.
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saltmarsh area, he suffered a $3,150,000 lOSS. 425 The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island rejected the claim. 426
The Supreme Court upheld the state's decision and determined that
there was no Lucas taking.427 The Court noted that while Palazzolo was
unable to build in the saltmarsh area, he was still able to build on the upland
portion of the property.428 The Court determined that Palazzolo's property
retained a $200,000 value in development. 429 Palazzolo argued that the state
should not be permitted to sidestep the holding in Lucas by simply leaving
the landowner a few "crumbs of value., 430 The Court agreed that a state
could not evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner is
left with a "token interest. ' '43I But it responded that in the situation at hand,
Palazzolo was left with more than a token interest.432 The Court argued that
the regulation allowed the landowner to build a substantial residence on his
eighteen-acre parcel.433 The Court concluded that the regulation did not
leave the property "economically idle," even though the regulation left the
property with a value of $200,000 when it would have been worth well over
three million dollars if Palazzolo had been permitted to build in the
marshland area.434
Palazzolo demonstrates the Supreme Court's tendency to resist any
attempt to narrowly define attributes of property ownership to show total
deprivation of economic use through regulation that proved to be
problematic for Lake Tahoe property owners.435
425. Id. at 616.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 621-22.
429. Id. at 621.
430. Id. at 631.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 631-32.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 631.
435. Freilich, supra note 15, at 174.
VII. TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, INC. V. TAHOE REGIONAL
PLANNING AGENCY
Tahoe-Sierra is a case with a long and complex history. 36 Landowners
who purchased property on the historically pristine lake have not been able
to construct or develop the property for over twenty years.437
Lake Tahoe is a unique lake located in the northern Sierra Nevada
Mountains. It is unique because of its size, depth, and the astounding clarity
of its water.438 The lake is one of the clearest in the world.439 Since mid-
century, however, the lake has undergone "eutophication," a process that
increases the nutrients entering into the lake, which has caused the lake to
lose some of its clarity.440 As nutrients wash into the lake from surrounding
lands, the growth of algae increases, which causes the lake to become
discolored and fish to be threatened.44' In an effort to halt the increasing rate
of environmental damage to Lake Tahoe, the bio-state Tahoe Regional
Planning Compact was approved in 1969 by the United States Congress.442
The Compact created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) and set
goals for the preservation of the lake and the surrounding basin.443
The Compact directed the Agency to divide the basin into "land
capability districts" depending on the susceptibility to environmental
damage.444  The Agency created a plan and divided the basin into
classifications, but the plan was criticized for not being strong enough to
remedy the problems causing the decline in the basin environment.445 The
Compact was amended in 1980; the Compact directed the Tahoe
Preservation Agency to (1) adopt environmental threshold carrying
capacities within eighteen months of the date on which the Compact became
effective, (2) adopt a new regional plan within twelve months of the
adoption of the carrying capacities, and (3) review all projects and establish
temporary restrictions on development in the basin pending the enactment of
the new regional plan.446
In order to comply, the Compact enacted a moratorium ordinance that
temporarily prohibited most residential and all commercial construction.447
436. Eagle, supra note 375, at 10224.
437. Id.
438. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 766 (9th
Cir. 2000), reh 'g denied, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Eagle, supra note 375, at 10224.
442. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 767.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 767-68.
447. Id. at 768.
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The ordinance stated that the provisions setting forth the moratorium would
expire upon the adoption of the new regional plan, which was supposed to
be within twelve months.448 The Agency was unable to adopt a new regional
plan within twelve months due to the complexity of the task; thus, a
moratorium was reissued which suspended development on all land within
the Tahoe basin. 449 The moratorium was outlined to expire within ninety
days but was extended until the new regional plan was adopted in April
1984, which was thirty-two months after the Compact and Planning Agency
had initially suspended development.450
A. District Court Opinion
Immediately after the plan was adopted, the State of California and the
State of Nevada sued and sought a preliminary injunction against the
implementation of the plan, stating that it was not stringent enough.41  A
district court judge in the Ninth Circuit issued a temporary restraining order
prohibiting TRPA from approving building projects, which remained in
force until a completely revised land-use plan was adopted almost three
years after the first plan was adopted. 452
Conversely, 450 property owners brought suit immediately after the
plan was adopted seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
damages for violations of the Takings Clause.453 The court stated that there
was no taking under the Penn Central analysis but determined that there was
a categorical Lucas taking.454 The court agreed with the landowners'
argument that the moratorium ordinance worked a taking of their property,
stressing that the regulation completely denied the plaintiffs of all
economically viable use of their property.455 The court had a difficult time
assessing the "total taking" issue. Although it was satisfied that the property
owners did retain some value during the moratorium, it found that they had
been temporarily deprived of all economically viable use of their land.456
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 768-69.
454. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1242
(D. Nev. 1999), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 216 F.3d 764 (9th 2000), reh g denied, 228 F.3d 998 (9th
Cir. 2000), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
455. Id. at 1245.
456. Id.
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The district court noted that the regulation was apparently "intended" to
be temporary since it was adopted pending the enactment of a new regional
plan, but there was no fixed termination date, which was problematic for the
district court. 457  The court also stated that it was not clear whether
development moratorium ordinances "remain[ed] legitimate planning tools
after First English.,458 The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court's
holding in First English did not apply to "normal delays," but distinguished
the moratorium ordinance at issue from normal planning delays.459 The
court reasoned that moratorium ordinances, which are enacted with no
deadline, are different than "simply putting a hold on development" for a
few weeks or a month in an effort to formulate a plan or zoning ordinance.
460
B. Ninth Circuit Opinion
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding and determined
that the temporary moratorium ordinance was not a compensable taking.46'
The Ninth Circuit stated that there could be no Lucas taking due to the
temporary nature of the moratorium ordinance, which supposedly "preserved
the bulk of the future developmental use of the property," giving the land a
"substantial present value. 462
Conceptual severance was at the center of the Tahoe-Sierra controversy,
and it was the pivotal question facing the Ninth Circuit.4 63 "Because [the
court's] test for regulatory taking requires [it] to compare the value that has
been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, one
of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property
'whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction. ' ' 464 The court
had to determine whether to view the plaintiffs' properties as "fee-simple
parcels with full lives ahead of them or as limited 'temporal' interests
divorced from any future years. The answer to this question had the
potential to sway the outcome either way by setting the
numerator/denominator framework for the court's takings calculus.
465
457. Id. at 1250.
458. Id. at 1249.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 782 (9th
Cir. 2000), reh 'g denied, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
462. Id. at 781.
463. Fox, supra note 317, at 404-05.
464. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 774 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)).
465. Fox, supra note 317, at 413.
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The landowners argued that First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles466 required the court to view their property interests
as temporal segments, but the Ninth Circuit rejected the interpretation.467 It
stated that the landowners' argument was "flatly incorrect. '4 68 The court
argued that First English was not even a case representing a taking.469
According to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court was only resolving what
remedy was available once a taking had already been proven. 470 The court
rejected the landowners' argument that First English applied to temporary
moratorium ordinances and stated that it would work a radical change in the
takings jurisprudence if it determined that First English required "property
interests [to] be carved up into finite temporal segments.'' 4 7' The Ninth
Circuit also drew guidance from the Supreme Court's general rejection of
conceptual severance in prior taking cases such as Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City4 72 and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n
v. DeBenedictis.4 7 3 The Ninth Circuit argued that these prior Supreme Court
taking cases supported the notion that the taking analysis must consider the
parcel as a whole.474 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in Andrus v. Allard,475 stating that the Court has already
rejected conceptual severance in the temporal dimension of property
rights.476 The Andrus Court stated that if a landowner possesses a full
bundle of property rights, the destruction of "one 'strand' of the bundle"
could not be viewed as a taking because the property must be viewed in its
entirety.477 The Ninth Circuit stated that if it did not reject the notion of
conceptual severance, it "would risk converting every temporary planning
466. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
467. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 777.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 778.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (rejecting the landowner's proposal to consider the airspace
above the Grand Central Station as a property interest separate and distinct from the rest of the
Grand Central Station site).
473. 480 U.S. 470, 497, 500-01 (1987) (refusing to consider the coal that the Act/regulation in
question required the plaintiffs to leave in place as a separate property interest, emphasizing that the
takings jurisprudence must consider the "parcel as a whole").
474. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 774-75.
475. 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (holding that the denial of one property right does not always
amount to a taking). "At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety." Id.
476. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 775.
477. Id.
moratorium into a categorical taking," which would run contrary to the
Supreme Court's rationalization that categorical takings are "relatively
rare."
4 78
After determining that the landowners' entire fee-owned interests should
serve as the denominator in the takings equation, the Ninth Circuit found
that the moratorium ordinance in question did not deprive the plaintiffs of all
economic value of their property, even though the landowners were
prevented from using their property for thirty-two months.47 9 The court
reasoned:
"[e]ven if the appellants' ability to sell their property was limited
during the pendency of the condemnation proceeding, the appellants
were free to sell or develop their property when the proceedings
ended. Mere fluctuations in value during the process of
governmental decision making, absent extraordinary delay, are
'incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a "taking" in
the constitutional sense.'
480
The Ninth Circuit stated that there could be no Lucas taking because the
temporary nature of the moratorium ordinance "preserved the bulk of the
future developmental use of the property," which had a "substantial present
value."48'
[There is market value in the property] based on the future use of
[the] land since only a fraction of the property's lifetime is affected.
Potential buyers may still be available because they understand the
ordinance is temporary, although they may pay less because of the
uncertainties raised by the moratorium .... Most importantly, the
Tahoe property owner may actually benefit from the moratorium if
a sustainable land use plan is created that preserves the ecological
integrity and aesthetic beauty of her community. In the long run,
the enjoyment and market value she derives from her property may
increase.482
This idealist view is not shared by the landowners who have not been
permitted to build on their land for the last twenty years. 483 The majority of
landowners who have been fighting the series of moratoria ordinances have
478. Id. at 777.
479. Id. at 781-82.
480. Id. at 776 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980), in turn
quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)).
481. Id. at 781.
482. Fox, supra note 317, at 418 (emphasis omitted).
483. David G. Savage, Drawn-Out Tahoe Case May Be a Watershed on Land Use, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2002, at Al.
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not realized the substantial future value the Ninth Circuit claimed they
have.484 Instead, the landowners' rights have been reduced to "paying taxes,
suffering foreclosure or selling their lots at bargain-basement prices to
,,411scavenging organizations acting for the government. One couple bought
their property in the 1970s with the intention of building a place to retire and
a place for their children and grandchildren to visit.486 Unfortunately, each
member of the couple is now eighty-four years old and is no longer able to
build a home for retirement or even sell their property.487
Facing the Ninth Circuit, the landowners/plaintiffs further relied on
First English to maintain that temporary moratoria ordinances are takings
that deserve compensation. The court agreed that First English said that if a
taking occurred, compensation was required, even if the taking is
temporary. 488 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that this holding did not imply
that temporary moratoria ordinances were thus categorized as temporary
takings. 489 The court said that the Supreme Court was very careful in its
definition and stated that temporary takings are those "takings which are
ultimately invalidated by the courts. 490  According to the First English
Court's definition, what is temporary "is not the regulation; rather, what is
temporary is the taking, which is rendered temporary only when an
ordinance that affects a taking is struck down by a court.",49' In other words,
it is a permanent regulation that ultimately "leads to a temporary taking
when a court invalidates the ordinance after the taking., 492  The Ninth
Circuit also expressed a concern with invalidating the temporary moratorium
ordinance, stating:
[T]he widespread invalidation of temporary planning moratoria
would deprive state and local governments of an important land-use
planning tool with a well-established tradition. ... [T]he breathing
room provided by temporary moratoria helps ensure that the
484. Id.
485. Kanner, supra note 4, at A21.
486. Savage, supra note 483, at Al.
487. Id.
488. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 778 (9th
Cir. 2000), reh 'g denied, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)).
planning process is responsive to the property owners and citizens
who will be affected by the resulting land-use regulations. 93
The court wanted to preserve local governments' ability to engage in
orderly, reasonable land-use planning. It stated that doing otherwise would
turn the Takings Clause into a weapon that could be used to penalize local
governments for attempting to protect public needs and interests.494
The court concluded its holding with an effort to illustrate that there are
some moratorium ordinances which may be determined to work a
compensable taking.495 The court argued that if a temporary moratorium
ordinance was "designed to be in force so long as to eliminate all present
value of a property's future use," the court "might" be obligated to conclude
that a compensable taking occurred.496 The court added that it doubted that
such an ordinance would ever be designed to last for so long.497 It was of no
consequence to the court that the moratorium ordinance in question was in
effect for eight months longer than expected.498 According to the court, the
moratorium was still in effect for "only" thirty-two months.499 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that this was only "a small fraction of the useful life of the
Tahoe properties." 500 "[T]he opinion seems to endorse any ban as long as it
is, in fact, 'temporary'--designed to dissolve upon the adoption of a new
regional plan.,
50 1
The Ninth Circuit denied the landowners' petition for rehearing;
whereupon, "five justices joined in a strongly-worded dissent that accused
the panel of turning its back on Supreme Court takings jurisprudence by
overruling the First English decision." 502 The dissent argued that the case at
hand was no different than Lucas, other than that the Lake Tahoe regulation
had a finite duration.50 3 It stated that the only question before the Ninth
Circuit was whether there was something special about a finite moratorium
ordinance that would relieve the government from its duty to compensate the
landowner.504 According to the dissent, this issue was resolved in First
493. Id. at 777.
494. Id. at 782
495. Id. at 781.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 781-82.
499. Id. at 782.
500. Id.
501. Douglas W. Kmiec, ZONING AND PLANNING DESKBOOK §§ 7:54, 7-389 (2d ed. 2001); see
also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998, 999 (9th Cir.
2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that, in the court's view, "a temporary regulation can never
be a regulatory taking"), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
502. Fox, supra note 317, at 415.
503. Tahoe-Sierra, 228 F.3d at 999 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
504. /d. at 999-1000 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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English, where the Supreme Court stated that temporary takings are "'not
different in kind from permanent takings"' which require compensation.0 5
The dissent argued that the panel's holding erroneously adopted Justice
Stevens' dissent in First English instead of correctly applying the majority's
holding.0 6 The majority in First English specifically held that a taking
occurs when a regulation deprives a landowner of all economical use of his
or her property, even if the deprivation is only temporary. 507 The dissent
noted that there was a problem with the panel's holding that the moratorium
ordinance at hand did not deprive the landowners of all economic value of
their land on the basis that future value remained in the land. 508 The dissent
disagreed with the majority's reasoning and maintained that the deprivation
of value and use are one and the same. 50 9 The two are interchangeable
because in the case of regulations that lack a sunset provision, "the
government [is allowed to] permanently prevent[] the owner from putting
his [or her] property to any beneficial use, [and] no potential buyer would
offer a dime for it." 510 Thus, the land has no use or value. 5''
The panel argued that the landowners retained future value in their
property, but the dissent pointed out that "temporary moratoria have a habit
of living beyond their purported termination dates."512 The dissent used the
instant case as an example and indicated that the landowners in Tahoe-Sierra
have been battling the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, which has
prevented them from building any homes on their lots for the last two
decades.513 The dissent concluded their opinion with a cautionary warning:
"If a local government can evade its constitutional obligations by describing
a regulation as 'temporary,' we create a sizable loophole to the Takings
Clause.... Under the theory adopted by the panel, it's hard to see when a
property owner would ever state a takings claim against such a scheme." 
51 4
505. Id. at 1000 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987)).
506. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
507. Id. at 1002 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Kellington, supra note 371, at 123 ("The basis
for the 9th Circuit majority opinion seems contrary to First English for the reason that the Supreme
C6iirt was clear that a total deprivation of all economically beneficial use is compensable and
expressly stated that it makes no difference if the regulation is temporary or permanent.").
508. Tahoe-Sierra, 228 F.3d at 1001 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id.
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C. Supreme Court's Opinion-Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "[w]hether the Court
of Appeals properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land
development does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation
under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. 51 5 The Court
heard the oral arguments on Monday, January 7, 2002.516 The Justices
appeared to be split as to their conclusions on the issue.517 Justice Kennedy
was concerned with the long-term ramifications and practical implications of
the landowners' argument that moratorium ordinances constitute a
compensable taking.518 He asked the landowners' attorney whether New
York City would have to compensate the owners of the World Trade Center
if the city froze development for a period of time to create a plan for the
devastated area.519 Justice Antonin Scalia, on the other hand, seemed to
favor the property rights and objected to the government's argument, stating
that halting the environmental damage to Lake Tahoe is a "social
problem."5' 0 He then inquired why some individuals should be forced to
bear the burden that will be enjoyed by society as a whole.521 He declared
that this was exactly what the Fifth Amendment protects against, but what
the planning agency was attempting to do.52
In a six-three decision, the Court affirmed the appellate court's
judgment, reversing the finding that an unconstitutional taking occurred.52
The Court did not spend much effort addressing the property owners'
deprived use of their property; instead, it relied on the detrimental effects
that would result from adopting a categorical rule preventing moratorium
ordinances.524
The majority began its analysis stating that since the property owners
made only a facial attack on the moratorium ordinances, they "[faced] an
uphill battle, that [was] made especially steep by their desire for a
categorical rule requiring compensation whenever the government imposes
such a moratorium on development., 52 5 The Court stated that if it adopted a
515. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1474
(2002).
516. Savage, supra note 482.
517. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: A Property Rights Claim Meets Resistance,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at A 16.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1470
(2002).
524. See id.
525. Id. at 1477 (citations omitted).
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categorical rule that allowed for compensation with any deprivation of all
economic use-no matter how brief-the results would be damaging.526
More specifically, the categorical rule would impose unreasonable financial
obligations upon governments for the normal delays involved in processing
land use applications and would improperly encourage hasty decision
making. 27
Because the property owners and the district court relied on Lucas to
categorize the moratorium ordinance as an unconstitutional taking, the Court
began its analysis illustrating the limits set out in Lucas.12 ' The Court
articulated that the Lucas opinion was only intended to apply in relatively
rare situations. 529 The Court emphasized:
Lucas carved out a narrow exception to the rules goveming
regulatory takings for the "extraordinary circumstance" of a
permanent deprivation of all beneficial use.... It was also justified
on the theory that, in the "relatively rare situations where the
government has deprived a landowner of all economically
beneficial uses," it is less realistic to assume that the regulation will
secure an "average reciprocity of advantage," or that government
could not go on if required to pay for every such restriction. 30
The property owners asked the Court to lay down a categorical rule
illustrating exactly when a moratorium ordinance affects a "regulatory
taking. 531 The Court denied the request and stated that, in its view, "the
answer to the abstract question" was neither "'yes, always' nor 'no,
never.' 532 The Court reiterated that it would only apply an ad hoc factual
inquiry, not create a categorical approach.533 Thus, the answer to whether a
moratorium ordinance is classified as a regulatory taking "depends upon the
particular circumstances of [each] case. 534 The Court acknowledged that a
simple mathematical precise formula would certainly be easier to apply, but
it resisted the temptation to adopt one.535 The Court argued that the "interest
526. Id. at 1487.
527. Id. at 148-88.
528. Id. at 1480.
529. Id. at 1480 n.19.
530. Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992)).
531. Id. at 1478.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 1481.
534. Id. at 1478.
535. Id.
325
in 'fairness and justice' [would] be best served by relying on the familiar
Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by
attempting to craft a new categorical rule. 536 It stated that the most it could
do was provide important "guideposts" to the ultimate determination of
whether a moratorium ordinance constitutes a taking wherein just
compensation would be required.537  The Court resisted creating a
categorical approach because, according to the Court, "[t]he Takings Clause
requires careful examination and weighing of all relevant circumstances. 538
After the Court recognized its reluctance to adopt a categorical rule, it
addressed the argument posed by the property owners regarding First
English.539 The Court accepted the supposition that First English was a
significant decision.5 40 Even though the Court was aware that First English
had left some confusion among the lower courts, the Court stated that
nothing it said in Tahoe-Sierra would qualify the First English holding.
41
The Court aligned itself with the appellate court's analysis and declared that
the First English Court did not address whether the temporary regulation at
issue had in fact constituted a taking.542 Rather, the First English Court
unambiguously characterized the issue as a remedial question.5 43 It merely
held that "'where the government's activities have already worked a taking
of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it
of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking
was effective.' 5 44  According to the Court, the First English Court
"expressly disavowed any ruling on the merit of the takings issue," and,
"once the California courts concluded that there had not been a taking," the
Supreme Court declined review of that decision. 45 The Court stated that
since the First English decision did not center on the "takings" issue, Lake
Tahoe property owners could not rely on it to prove that the moratorium
ordinances affected a taking.
546
The Court was willing to admit that it referenced the "antecedent takings
question" in First English.547 But it stated that its decision in First English
"surely did not approve, and implicitly rejected, the categorical submission
536. Id. at 1489.
537. Id. at 1481 n.23.
538. Id. at 1481.
539. Id. at 1482.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)).
545. id.
546. Id.
547. Id.
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that [the property owners were] now advocating. '548 The Court cited Lucas
to disprove the property owners' argument as well.549 The Court declared
that even though Lucas endorsed a categorical rule, it was not the one the
property owners were proposing. 5 0 The categorical rule espoused in Lucas,
according to the Court, states that "compensation is required when a
regulation deprives an owner of 'all economically beneficial uses' of his [or
her] land." 55' The Court recognized that its holding in Lucas "was limited to
the 'extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically
beneficial use of land is permitted,"' and if there is anything less than a
complete diminution of value, Lucas would not apply.
552
Despite the Court's caveat that Lucas was inapplicable, the Court still
analyzed whether the Lake Tahoe property owners lost all economically
beneficial use of their property.553 To answer this question, the Court had to
decide if it would engage in conceptual severance.554 The Court rejected the
notion of conceptual severance, stating that it had "consistently" rejected
such an approach.5 5 The Court stated: "[the property owners'] 'conceptual
severance' argument [was] unavailing because it ignore[d] Penn Central's
admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on the 'parcel as a
whole.' ' 556  Unfortunately, the Court merely rejected conceptual
severance-as it has done on numerous other occasions-but it did not
expressly disavow the line of cases in which the Court adhere[d] to
conceptual severance.5 57  The Court had an opportunity to clear up the
confusion it had created in the past, but it refused to do so.558 Instead, the
Court simply rebuked the district court for following its prior case law.559
The Court stated:
548. Id.
549. Id. at 1482.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 1483 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019
(1992)).
552. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017).
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)).
557. See id. at 1483-84.
558. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Boyd, supra note 357,
at 805.
559. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1484. But see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606
(2001) (concluding that the relevant parcel issue was still an unsettled matter); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (stating that a segment
could constitute the denominator of the takings fraction for purposes of the takings analysis); Eagle,
supra note 146, at 11232; Fox, supra note 317, at 402.
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[T]he District Court erred when it disaggregated [property owners']
property into temporal segments corresponding to the regulations at
issue and then analyzed whether [property owners] were deprived of
all economically viable use during each period. The starting point
for the court's analysis should have been to ask whether there was a
total taking of the entire parcel ....
An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that
describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that
describes the temporal aspect of the owner's interest. Both
dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be viewed in its
entirety. Hence, a permanent deprivation of the owner's use of the
entire area is a taking of "the parcel as a whole," whereas a
temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in value is
not.5
60
The Court concluded its Lucas analysis by declaring that if the Court
could not engage in conceptual severance, the property owners' "total
taking" argument had no merit.
561
The Court gave brief consideration to a new emerging taking test known
as the "fairness and justice" test.5 62 The Court acknowledged that it had not
yet announced a categorical rule that, "in the interest of fairness and justice,"
the government would be forced to compensate a landowner when it
temporarily deprived the owner of "all economic viable use of his or her
property., 563 The Court refused to take this opportunity to adopt such a
test.564 The Court presented the test as a possibility, but it then dismissed it
abruptly, stating that the Takings Clause would be better served by the ad
hoc factual inquiry established in Penn Central, as opposed to some
categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how
brief, constitutes a compensable taking.
565
After dismissing the fairness test, the landowners' argument seeking
compensation for a temporary taking that relied on Penn Central and First
English resurfaced, wherein the Court again rejected the landowners' plea
and argued that a categorical rule recognizing compensable takings with
brief deprivations would "undoubtedly require changes in numerous
practices that have long been considered permissible exercises of the police
560. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483-84 (citations omitted).
561. Id.
562. Id. at 1484.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 1485.
565. Id.
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power., 566 With that, the Court warned that the government could operate if
the Court enacted such a change in the general takings law.567 The Court
claimed that important changes in the law that would effect the government
so profoundly should be the "product of legislative rulemaking rather than
adjudication." 568
The Court is correct in noting that the legislature is charged with
changing public policy, but the Court has long affirmed and undertaken its
role in overseeing government action.569  In fact, the Court's role is to
protect and enforce the Constitution.5 70  The Constitution, by way of the
Fifth Amendment, requires that the government be barred from forcing some
people to bear public burdens alone, which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole.5 7' The constitutionality of allowing the
government to take a property owner's lake front property for twenty years
without compensation is clearly not an issue for the government to
remedy-this is expressly the Court's domain, but unfortunately for the
landowners, the Court refused to do its job.572
The Court's confusion in Tahoe-Sierra culminated when the Court
stated that, despite its holding that the moratorium ordinances in Lake Tahoe
were not a compensable taking, some moratorium ordinances could be.573
The Court even agreed that "any moratorium that lasts for more than one
year should be viewed with special skepticism. 5 74 Nonetheless, the Court
decided that it would be unreasonable to create a rule that all delays of over
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378-79 (2000).
When federal judges exercise their federal-question jurisdiction under the "judicial
Power" of Article III of the Constitution, it is "emphatically the province and duty" of
those judges to "say what the law is." At the core of this power is the federal courts'
independent responsibility-independent from its coequal branches in the Federal
Government, and independent from the separate authority of the several States-to
interpret federal law.
Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
570. See City ofBoemes v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of
the government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations
of the other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within
the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.
Id.
571. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
572. See id.
573. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
574. Id.
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one year are constitutionally unacceptable; instead, the courts must always
analyze such situations using the Penn Central ad hoc balancing test.575 To
institutionalize the lower courts' uncertainty with temporary takings and
moratorium ordinances in general, the Court concluded its opinion, stating:
[t]here may be moratoria that last longer than one year which
interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations, but as the
District Court's opinion illustrates, [property owners'] proposed
rule is simply "too blunt an instrument," for identifying those cases.
We conclude, therefore, that the interest in "fairness and justice"
will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn Central
approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by attempting to
craft a new categorical rule.576
Tahoe-Sierra was thought to provide assistance to the lower courts and
guide them through the uncertainty the takings jurisprudence has caused
over the years.577 Regrettably, this opinion only made a highly controversial
and confusing concept more difficult to apply and defend.578
D. Supreme Court Opinion-Dissenting Opinion
Over the years, Chief Justice Rehnquist has constantly demonstrated an
increased willingness to reconceptualize the Takings Clause in an attempt to
neutralize a wide range of environmental and land-use regulations in an
effort to uphold personal liberty.579 With the Chief Justice's desire to rein in
government programs and amplify property owners' rights, it is no surprise
that he championed the dissenting opinion in Tahoe-Sierra.580
The Chief Justice began his dissent by noting that the property owners
have been prohibited from building on their property for over half a
decade.581 The Chief Justice argued that "[b]ecause the Takings Clause
requires the government to pay compensation when it deprives owners of all
economically viable use of their land, and because a ban on all development
lasting almost six years does not resemble any traditional land-use planning
device, I dissent. ' '582 The Chief Justice charged the majority with failing to
undertake a proper inquiry as to whether the moratorium ordinances went
575. Id.
576. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001)).
577. See Haar & Wolf, supra note 3, at 2169.
578. Id. at 2201-02.
579. Id. at 2169.
580. See id. at 2201; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1490 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
581. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1490 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
582. Id. (citations omitted).
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too far.583 The Chief Justice complained that the majority ignored much of
the government planning agency's conduct and relied instead on the "flawed
determination" that the moratorium only lasted for three years.
584
The dissent argued that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency was
certainly responsible for the injunction issued in this case because the first
plan did not comply with the compact.585 The dissent indicated that since
the Agency was responsible for its own regulations, it would logically
follow that it was the "'moving force"' behind the property owners' inability
to develop their land until 1987.586 Therefore, if the property owners were
unable to develop their land for six years because of the Agency's conduct,
it should be responsible for compensating them for a regulatory taking.
5 87
To support his conclusion, the dissent emphasized that the district court
held that the moratorium ordinances "'did in fact deny the plaintiffs all
economically viable use of their land,' [and] [t]he Court of Appeals did not
overturn this finding. '588 The dissent thought that despite the lower courts'
holdings, it was apparent that the moratorium ordinances in question
affected a taking.5 89 The dissent explained:
because the environmental thresholds issued by [the Agency] did
not permit the development of single-family residences, [they]
forced [the landowners] to leave their land economically idle for at
least another three years. The Court [did] not dispute that [the
landowners] were forced to leave their land economically idle
during this period. But the Court refuse[d] to apply Lucas on the
ground that the deprivation was "temporary.
590
The dissent was appalled at the distinction and argued that it was
arbitrary. 591 He stated that it was not supported by logic or case law. 592 The
dissent argued: "[n]either the Takings Clause nor our case law supports such
a distinction. For one thing, a distinction between 'temporary' and
583. Id.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 1491 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
586. Id.
587. Id. at 1491-92 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
588. Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp.
2d 1226, 1245 (D. Nev. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 216 F.3d 764 (9th 2000), reh 'g denied,
228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).
589. Id.
590. Id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C., dissenting) (citation omitted).
591. Id.
592. Id.
'permanent' prohibitions is tenuous.... The 'permanent' prohibition in
Lucas lasted less than two years because the law, as it often does,
changed., 593  The dissent discussed the long-term ramifications the
majority's opinion would have on future government actions and cases
implicating a takings violation.594 The Chief Justice criticized the majority
opinion, stating:
[u]nder the court's decision today, the takings question turns
entirely on the initial label given a regulation, a label that is often
without much meaning. There is every incentive for [the]
government to simply label any prohibition on development
"temporary," or to fix a set number of years. As in this case, this
initial designation does not preclude the government from
repeatedly extending the "temporary" prohibition into a long-term
ban on all development.... Apparently, the Court would not view
even a 10-year moratorium as a taking under Lucas because the
moratorium is not "permanent." '595
The dissent simply could not see the distinction between the facts in
Lucas and the facts presented by the Lake Tahoe property owners.596 The
dissent claimed that it was unreasonable for the majority to distinguish this
case from Lucas by suggesting that the Lake Tahoe property owners retained
some future value in their property while the property owner in Lucas did
not.5 97 The dissent acknowledged that "[s]urely, the land at issue in Lucas
retained some market value based on the contingency, which soon came to
fruition, that the development ban would be amended. 598
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that there is no question that
Lucas is implicated when the government deprives a landowner of all
economically beneficial use of his or her land-period.5 99 The dissent noted
that the district court and majority both agreed that the Lake Tahoe
moratorium temporarily deprived the landowners of all economically viable
use of their land.600 The dissent emphasized that the Court has been clear
that the rationale for Lucas applies "just as strongly" in the case of a
temporary denial of all economically viable use. 601 The dissent cited the
opinions in First English and Palazzolo to support the conclusion that the
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Id. at 1493-94 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
597. Id. at 1494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
598. Id. (citations omitted).
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id.
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temporary denial of all viable use of the Lake Tahoe owners' land for six
years was in fact a Lucas taking.60 2 The dissent warned that the Court was
ignoring the constitutional demand that requires that the costs and burdens
be borne by the public at large-not by a few targeted citizens. 60 3 The Chief
Justice stated that "Justice Holmes' admonition of 80 years ago again rings
true: '[W]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.'
60 4
Justice Thomas filed a supplementary dissenting opinion wherein he
agreed with the rational stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 6 5 He wrote
separately to address the majority's conclusion that the temporary
moratorium was not a taking of the parcel as a whole.60 6 The Justice could
not comprehend how the majority could come to such a conclusion after
First English.60 7 The Justice stated that First English specifically held that
temporary and permanent takings were not different in kind when a
landowner was deprived of all economically viable use of his or her land.60 8
The Justice thought that First English:
put to rest the notion that the "relevant denominator" is land's
infinite life. Consequently, a regulation affecting a total deprivation
of the use of a so-called "temporal slice" of the property is
compensable under the Takings Clause unless background
principles of state property law prevent it from being deemed a
taking ....609
According to Justice Thomas, "[a] taking is exactly what occurred in
this case" because no one could seriously doubt that the moratorium
ordinance deprived the landowners of all economically beneficial use of
their land.610
602. Id.
603. Id. at 1496 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
604. Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
605. Id. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In prior decisions, courts have determined that temporary moratoria
ordinances are valid as long as they do not cause an unreasonable delay, but
the Supreme Court has never determined what constitutes an unreasonable
delay. 61 ' The Court had the opportunity to finally resolve this ongoing
dispute, but it refused to do so. 612 Instead, the Court reiterated the Court's
reliance on an abstract ad hoc factual analysis. 613 Unfortunately, the Court
refused to give additional guidance to the lower courts, Lake Tahoe property
owners, and society in general.614 The Court merely concluded that "[t]here
may be moratoria that last longer than one year which interfere with
reasonable investment-backed expectations," but the moratorium ordinance
in the instant case-affecting a twenty year ban on all development-did not
interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations. 615 As the dissent
pointed out, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the Court would find
that a moratorium ordinance violated the Fifth Amendment if it declined to
do so in the instant case.616
Lower courts are now no more certain when to strike down a
moratorium ordinance because its time frame is considered unreasonable
than before Tahoe-Sierra.61 7 The only guidance the lower courts acquired
from the Tahoe-Sierra opinion was the basic premise that if the government
labels the action as "temporary" it is all but impossible for the court to find
the action to be a taking.618 Some commentators were hoping that the Court
would take this opportunity to finally resolve the ongoing dispute between
property owners and city planners. 619 A number of land use analysts and
scholars were optimistic that the Court would finally hold that moratorium
ordinances must in fact be temporary. 620 This seemed a logical extension of
611. See State ex rel. SCA Chem. Waste Services, Inc. v. Konigsberg, 636 S.W.2d 430, 435
(Tenn. 1982) (stating that courts are to uphold temporary moratorium ordinances as long as they are
enacted pursuant to specific standards); see also Taylor v. City of Little Rock, 583 S.W.2d 72 (Ark.
1979) (upholding a city zoning ordinance where the city complied with statute requirements);
Almquist v. Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819, 829 (Minn. 1976) (upholding a six-month moratorium
ordinance because it was enacted pursuant to proper procedural requirements); Sherman v. Reavis,
257 S.E.2d 735 (S.C. 1979) (holding that an ordinance is legal if the governing body has advertised
to the public its intention to hold public hearings on the rezoning matter).
612. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478 (stating that the answer to the "abstract question" of
whether a moratorium ordinance constitutes a taking is neither "'yes, always' nor 'no, never"';
rather, the answer "depends upon the particular circumstances of [each] case").
613. Id.
614. See id.
615. Id. at 1489.
616. Id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
617. See id.
618. See id.
619. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037; see also Freilich, supra note 15, at 181.
620. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037; see also Freilich, supra note 15, at 181.
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its prior holdings.62' If this were true, future moratorium ordinances would
be required to have a sunset clause, and the ordinance would be required to
terminate upon that date or risk a taking challenge.622 Alas, for the 450
property owners who have lost twenty years to this controversy, the Court
only perpetuated the dispute between landowners and city planners.623
The Court did state that moratorium ordinances must, in fact, be
temporary.624 However, this opinion did nothing to enforce the decree.625
Not only does it not enforce the theory, it allows the government to avoid
ever paying citizens just compensation by simply labeling its action as
"temporary., 626 As Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged:
Under the Court's decision today, the takings question turns entirely
on the initial label given a regulation, a label that is often without
much meaning. There is every incentive for [the] government to
simply label any prohibition on development "temporary," or to fix
a set number of years. As in this case, this initial designation does
not preclude the government from repeatedly extending the
"temporary" prohibition into a long-term ban on all
development.... Apparently, the Court would not view even a 10-
year moratorium as a taking under Lucas because the moratorium is
not "permanent.,
627
Under the rationale espoused by the majority, there will be little
incentive for local governments to put sunset clauses in their ordinances or
in fact terminate them when they are scheduled to expire because, as the
Tahoe-Sierra majority explained, it does not matter if the moratorium
ordinances expire when the are scheduled to expire, only that they are
intended to be temporary.628 The Court's decision thereby allows a
government to repeatedly extend its temporary prohibition into a long-term
ban on all development. 629 The Court's ruling would seem to allow the
government to do by regulation what it obviously cannot do by eminent
621. See Roberts, supra note 7, 11037; see also Alperin, supra note 2, at 170; Freilich, supra note
15, at 181.
622. See Alperin, supra note 2, at 170.
623. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
624. Id. at 1480.
625. Id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
626. See id.
627. Id.
628. See id.
629. Changing Course: U.S. Supreme Court Rules in Takings Case, 227 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2002).
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domain-freeze the use of private property without paying for it.630 Simply
put, this opinion ignores the admonition put forth by Justice Holmes almost
eighty years ago that a strong public desire to improve the environment or
society as a whole is not enough to warrant achieving the desire in an
unconstitutional manner and not paying for the change.631
The Court may not have taken the bait to clear the murky waters it left
with its decision in First English.632 But, in the very least, the Court did
emphasize that temporary moratorium ordinances are within the definition of
"normal delays" that the Court said were not within the grasp of temporary
takings.633 Unfortunately, state and federal courts will remain perplexed by
what the Court means by "temporary," and the First English and Palazzolo
opinions remain a mystery.6" The bewildering and contradictory language
is not any clearer now than when it was enunciated. 635 Rather than explain
the confusion in the Tahoe-Sierra opinion, the Court merely concluded that
neither of the opinions were applicable to the Tahoe analysis.636
The final issue the Court had an opportunity to clarify was its position
on conceptual severance.637 The Court has passed the buck on this issue for
years and, even though the conceptual severance issue was at the center of
the Tahoe controversy, the Court simply passed the buck again.638 The
Court insisted that it has consistently refused the opportunity to engage in
conceptual severance in the past and it refused to do so here as well, but
what the Court did not mention was that the Court has, on occasion,
accepted conceptual severance. 639 Not only did the Court not specifically
reject the line of cases that support conceptual severance, the Court did not
even acknowledge them.640 This has been a reoccurring practice for the
Court. 64' The Court either simply refuses to participate in conceptual
severance and cite the line of cases which support this conclusion, or the
Court partakes in the practice and cites the line of cases which support that
642assumption.
The Court's decision was particularly important in the instant case,
because it had the potential of affecting the future of all moratorium
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1482, 1484.
633. Id. at 1485.
634. See Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232; Fox, supra note 317, at 402-03.
635. See Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232; Fox, supra note 317, at 402-03.
636. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1484.
637. Id. at 1480; see also Boyd, supra note 357, at 815.
638. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1481.
639. Id.
640. Id.
641. See Eagle, supra note 146, at 11232; Fox, supra note 317, at 402-03.
642. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1481.
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ordinances.643 If the Court had declared that temporal segregation is
permitted, all moratorium ordinances could be categorized as a taking. 6
The Court's decision will likely have the opposite effect. 64' Under the
existing position, property owners will certainly face an uphill battle any
time they facially challenge a moratorium ordinance.646  The Court
articulated that a regulation must affect an entire parcel-limiting it by time,
use, and space-before a court can determine that the owner has been
deprived of all economically viable use of his or her property.647 Moreover,
the Court categorized moratorium ordinances as normal planning delays
used to preserve the status quo while formulating a development strategy,
and these "normal delays" are "[u]nlike the 'extraordinary circumstance' in
which the government deprives a property owner of all economic use.
'
,
648
Thus, despite the Court's inference that determining whether a temporary
moratorium effects a taking is never a "'yes, always,' nor 'no, never,'
answer, it is very difficult to identify an instance when a temporary
moratorium ordinance would effect a taking under the majority's analysis. 649
Although the takings law remains muddled, post-Tahoe-Sierra regulatory
taking analysis contains an "identifiable regimen"-the Court always
follows an ad-hoc factual analysis of the factual record.650
"The right to own property and do with it as one chooses is a cherished
right of every United States citizen., 65' The right, however, is not absolute,
and individual liberty must be restricted to protect the environment and
society in general - a lesson Tahoe-Sierra exemplifies to all property
owners. 652 "The law of regulatory takings sits in the balance of these often
conflicting purposes. '653 While the balance has tipped in favor of property
owners in the past, the balance is clearly in favor of the government under
the current takings analysis. 654 The Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-
Sierra will have a distinct and profound effect on the future of all land use
643. See Boyd, supra note 357, at 796.
644. See id.
645. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
646. See id.
647. Id. at 1477-79.
648. Id. at 1486-87 (emphasis added) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1017 (1992)).
649. See id. at 1478. But see id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
650. Herber, supra note 280, at 929.
651. Boyd, supra note 357, at 793.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. Haar & Wolf, supra note 3, at 2169.
planning in general.655  It is true that an owner is not entitled to
compensation in every delay caused by the government, however,
prohibiting all economic and beneficial use for years is surely a different
scenario, and clearly a circumstance which would seem to require
compensation. After all, this is exactly what the Fifth Amendment claimsto prevent.657
Laura Hurmence McKaskle
338
655. Roberts, supra note 7, at 11037.
656. Changing Course: U.S. Supreme Court Rules in Takings Case, 227 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2002).
657. Id.
